The roots of political violence
There is certainly no simple explanation for political violence, but finding its roots
can only help to provide some guidance to this complex phenomenon. Political
violence is not necessarily to be found in the harshest regimes since highly efficient
dictatorships can make political violence extremely difficult, whereas it is a sad fact
of life that regimes which are either democratic or partly democratic have become
much more vulnerable to violent attack. Regimes which appeared democratic at the
outset of such an attack may cease to be so – like the Uruguayan crushing of the
Tupamaros – after the threat has been dealt with (Friedlander, 1979: 235).
Laqueur argues that while poverty is a factor, it should not be exaggerated: very
poor countries may see civil unrest and even civil war, but not political violence. The
followers of political violence might be poor, whereas the leaderships are wealthy
and middle class: political violence ‘rarely occurs in the poorest and richest countries,
especially if these happen to be small societies in which there is little anonymity;
between these extremes, political violence can occur almost anywhere’. He cites Kofi
Annan, former Secretary General of the UN, to the effect that the poor suffer enough:
why add to their misery by branding them potential practitioners of political violence
(Laqueur, 2003: 16, 18)? Alongside poverty must be added national and ethnic
conflict, although this kind of conflict has not been evident in some countries in which
political violence has occurred. It is useful to distinguish between the ‘symptoms’
and ‘causes’ of political violence (von Hippel, 2002: 25). No strategy can be successful
which simply addresses itself to the symptoms, and ignores the reasons as to why
political violence arises. Just as it is difficult to define political violence, it is also
difficult to locate the roots of such violence, but what can be said is that political
violence arises because people cannot ‘change places’. This is not because people are
different, since we are all different from one another – in terms of our age, occupation,
gender, outlook, etc. There is a multiplicity of factors involved in an inability to
change places: significant disparities in wealth; religious intolerance; bitterness and
despair; and the prevalence of a ‘blame’ culture which helps to convert differences
into divisions. When these divisions are not understood, and no realistic strategy exists
for overcoming them, we can have political violence.
The problem with the Laqueur analysis is that it sees political violence as
insoluble. ‘It stands to reason’, he argues, ‘that if all mankind were to live in small
countries, preferably in small cities, and if all human beings were well off, there
would be less violence’, be it crime or political violence. ‘But there is no reason to
assume that violence would disappear altogether’ (2003: 15). Laqueur seeks to argue
that political violence per se is ineradicable. It is clear that no factor, on its own,
will do the trick. Removing the problem posed by the state of Israel, eliminating
world poverty, tackling repression and injustice, reducing the frustration which
inequality engenders, addressing a culture that glorifies war would clearly help to
reduce political violence. But it would be foolish, indeed, to imagine that any
particular factor, or even taking them together, would eliminate political violence.
The way in which, for example, former colonies had their boundaries drawn –
dividing linguistic and ethnic groups in arbitrary fashion – has stored up appalling
problems that will take decades to resolve. Yet why should we assume that political
violence will always exist?456 Part 4 Contemporary ideas