To argue, as Laqueur does, that ‘there are no known cures for fanaticism and
paranoia’ (2003: 10), is to suggest that psychological problems lie outside of social
relationships and cause political violence. We know, for example, that depression
and mental illness can arise from problematic family relationships and these are
often linked to aggressive, authoritarian and patriarchal attitudes. Psychological
problems have their roots in social relationships. To suggest that political violence
will always be with us because it is a complex phenomenon, is to generalise from
the contemporary world in a way that creates fatalism and despair. The point is
that in a world in which poverty, national and ethnic injustices, patriarchal policies
and practices were being tackled, people would be better able to ‘change places’
than they can at the moment. A reduction in political violence implies logically that
political violence can be eliminated, since there is no evidence that it is part of
human nature to murder, maim and destroy for political reasons.
Von Hippel is more positive than Laqueur. She notes that strong authoritarian
states – like Egypt, Algeria and Saudi Arabia – may also provide conditions for
political violence, just as the collapse of states, like the Sudan and Somalia, may
provide a breeding ground. She concedes that ‘sharpening the focus on root causes’
can lead to ‘politically awkward situations and policy choices’. Nevertheless, these
need to be addressed if ‘the counterterrorist campaign is to succeed’ (von Hippel,
2002: 38). It is difficult to eradicate political violence, but the problem is not in
principle insoluble.The problem of violence and the state
We have already cited Hobbes’s comment that the state uses terror to maintain
order. Friedlander argued in 1979 that perhaps it is time to use violence against
those who resort to it (1979: 232). It seems to us that built into Weber’s definition
of the state is an emphasis on the use of violence to settle conflicts of interest,
and therefore it can only be plain prejudice to assume that the state cannot or does
not use violence against its enemies. Von Hippel concedes that ‘no state has a
complete monopoly on organized violence’ (2002: 30) and as we have pointed out
in Chapter 1 on the State, states claim a monopoly which they cannot and do
not have.
There is a good deal of confusion in this area. On the one hand, one writer seems
to think it necessary to separate political violence from the monopolistic use of
violence claimed by states, and sees political violence as the work of subnational
groups or non-state entities. On the other hand, he says that during the 1930s
political violence became ‘a state monopoly’, ‘reminding observers that enforcement
political violence has been much more destructive than agitational political violence’
(Gearson, 2002: 11, 15). The reference to ‘enforcement political violence’ surely
implies that states can and do exercise violence, even terror.
Laqueur sees the argument that states use force as a ‘red herring’, although he
concedes that the political violence exercised by states has caused far more victims
than the political violence exercised by small groups. He gives the example of Nazi
Germany and Stalinist Russia (2003: 237), and, it is important to note, even liberalChapter 20 Political violence 457