Defining difference
The concept of difference can only be defined when you seek to establish your
identity. A person’s identity simply arises from how she sees herself (Alibhai-Brown,
2000: 123). Do you define yourself by your nationality – as say British (or Scottish,
Welsh or English) or a Norwegian, or a German; do you feel yourself defined by
your religion – as a Jew, Christian, Muslim or whatever? Do you identify yourself
by your gender, skin colour, region, class, sexual orientation, etc.? Normally the
question of identity depends upon context.
If you are travelling outside of the UK, for example, your British nationality will
be one you continually assert, whereas in Britain, it may be an identity that you
invoke much less frequently. If you are visiting a memorial for the victims of the
Holocaust, you may feel that it is relevant to assert a Jewish identity; if a colleague
is telling you about her sexual problems, then the fact that you are female and, say,
gay becomes an identity that you wish to express, even though in other contexts
this is an identity that may not require emphasis. A heated argument over the Iraq
War may cause you to mention that you come from the Middle East and are a
devout Muslim.
It is clear that having an identity only really arises as something of which you are
aware when you wish to differentiate yourself from someone else. It is because your
nationality is distinctive, or your gender, sexual orientation, religion, etc. is not
universally held, that your identity comes to the fore. This is why identity is always
linked to difference. You are unlikely to assert your identity as a human being unless
you are arguing about human rights or discussing the question as to whether animals
suffer, since people by definition are human beings, and your human identity is not
normally seen as a differentiating factor. This is why difference always implies iden-
tity, since to know who you are, you must also know who you are not. Understand-
ably people resent their identity being expressed in negative terms. Blacks under
apartheid felt aggrieved at being referred to as ‘non-whites’: an identity that implies
a deficiency or lack on the part of those thus labelled. It is said that while ‘difference’
is endlessly invoked in feminist theory, it is often not defined (Hughes, 2002: 57).
The value of asserting identity arises because it is something all people have, even
though people who have a dominant identity may think that it is something ‘others’
have and they do not. The word ‘ethnic’, for example, is frequently used about those
who differ from the dominant norm, as in a situation in which whites in France say
that they do not have an ethnic identity: this is something that belongs to others.
Feminists feel aggrieved when the word ‘man’ is used as a synonym for humankind
and are not reassured by the argument that ‘man’ includes women as well. Such
identifiers echo earlier assumptions that the only people who really count are males,
and therefore it seems appropriate to use ‘man’ in this all-embracing way.
In fact, we all have an identity and we all have more than one. This means that
everybody is different from everyone else. A number of crucial questions arise when
teasing out the implications of our definition. Are some of our identities more
important than others, or does it simply depend upon context? How do we resolve
our differences? Do we regard ‘others’ as enemies that we have to repel, or partners
to negotiate with? Under what circumstances do differences become an occasion
for violence and war?468 Part 4 Contemporary ideas