Introduction to Political Theory

Some identities are emancipatory, for instance, that of a gay person striving for

justice and recognition in a homophobic society. But some are not. Think, for

example, of a gay person seeking medical treatment because they see their sexual

differences as ‘unnatural’ and deviant. If we take the view that the politics of

emancipation is itself to be rejected, then how can a discussion of identity and

difference be linked to self-development and the self-government of all individuals?

Difference ceases to be something we can evaluate (and if it is a real difference,

something we can value), and becomes instead a source merely of mystification.

Feminist theory and difference

Clearly, the first feminists saw difference as something negative, because it was used

to justify discrimination. When Locke or Rousseau spoke of female traits, they spoke

Chapter 21 Difference 473

Ideas and perspectives: sex and gender

A good example of the problem of some poststructuralist treatments of difference is the

question of sex and gender. Feminist theory has traditionally distinguished the two by saying

that whereas gender is historical and social, sex is natural and biological. The concern is to

challenge the way in which natural biological differences between women and men have been

linked to questions of power and domination so that it is argued by defenders of male

domination that the biological differences between men and women justify discrimination and

exclusion.

Of course, biological questions can be complicated by the fact that identities may overlap

so that there are genuinely ambiguous individuals who are both men and women, or who wish

to change from one sex to another. But, broadly speaking, we can argue that there should be

gender equality and that biological differences while ‘relevant’ have no causative significance

in explaining why men may be deemed more powerful than women (Connell, 1987: 82–3,

139–40). The latter is a question of gender rather than sex. It is true that there is a linkage

between sex and gender. In sexist societies, gender is reduced to sex so that biological difference

is seen as a cause of discrimination, and women and men have different ‘memories’ based on

this treatment. But even in a society where there was gender equality, one could still argue

that biological differences would have social implications (Hoffman, 2001: 39). The fact that

women give birth to children and are prone, for example, to breast cancer, will necessarily

mean that different social patterns of behaviour are relevant to their well-being.

But while it is true that gender and sex are linked, it does not follow that the body is simply

created through discourse and has a meaning that, in Shildrick’s words, lies ‘not in biological

fact, but is constructed in and by representation’ (1997: 179). Clearly where sex is part of

social activity, it is gendered and its meaning reflects power relationships and cultural mores.

But like hunger, sexuality is not wholly divorced from nature, and therefore there is a distinction

between sex and gender that arises from the fact that one is a social construct whereas the

other is not. There is certainly a link between sex and gender but there is also a difference.

Focus