they have need to be respected, so that people feel comfortable with their identity
and able to participate in government.
But what about differences that lead to intolerance and subjugation? Supposing
it was argued that only Christians or Muslims could stand for office and vote, form
political parties and be regarded as legitimate political actors, what would these
differences mean for democracy? A useful guide here is Mill’s harm principle (see
Chapter 2 on Freedom). Differences that harm another’s interest cannot be regarded
as legitimate, and need to be subject to social and legal sanctions. It cannot be
accepted that because someone is of a different gender, sexual orientation, religion,
etc. they cannot take part in the political process. We have argued above that to
treat difference as justification for discrimination is to distort the concept.
Recognising difference as part of a person’s identity must imply that such difference
is compatible with the differences of others.
What happens if a person’s apparent difference leads them to harm themselves?
It depends, it could be argued, as to whether this harm is reversible or not. A person
may distinguish herself from another, for example, by drinking a substantial amount
of alcohol on one particular day, but, once she recovers from her hangover, she
suffers no long-term effects. But what happens if this is part of an addiction to
drink that undermines a person’s health, so that as a result of repeated drinking,
such a person cannot take part in political activity? This is a ‘difference’ that, in
our view, is problematic, since it undermines self-development in a way that is
potentially irreversible. While it may not be appropriate to employ legal sanctions
against people who self-harm in such a way, social pressures are certainly justified
since this kind of ‘difference’ hinders democratic activity. It is a pathology and not
really a difference (as we have defined it), and whether it is harm irreversibly inflicted
upon others or upon oneself, it is problematic for democracy and requires social
intervention to arrest it.
Advancing democracy makes it necessary that we distinguish authentic differences
from pseudo-differences. Pseudo-differences are those used to justify discrimination
and exclusion: we need to act against the latter, preferably through social sanctions,
but through the use of physical force if all else fails. It could be argued that we
‘discriminate’ against children and unqualified people by imposing upon them
various restrictions because they are ‘different’: who would like to be operated upon
by someone who has not properly trained as a surgeon? These are terminological
points. In our view, acts to prevent harm do not count as ‘discrimination’ and,
therefore, we are identifying relevant and thus genuine ‘differences’. To refuse to
allow a suitably qualified person to be a surgeon would be to exploit a ‘pseudo-
difference’. A democratic attitude towards difference must concern itself as to
whether differences promote self-development or (we would call them pseudo-
differences) prevent it.
The state is more contentious because whereas the notion of democracy as self-
government is widely accepted (although its implications are not), the state is often
seen as unproblematic in character. Yet an institution claiming a monopoly of
legitimate force must threaten difference. The use of force to address conflicts of
interest means that a person’s identity is necessarily disregarded, and they become a
thing. This may be the only way to tackle what we have called ‘pseudo-differences’,
that is the assertion of attributes that inflict harm. A person who feels that as a patriot,
they can attack others, throw bricks through their windows, etc. may need to be
Chapter 21 Difference 477