Political solutions precede economic ones. Parallel to this political debate there is
a philosophical, or ethical, one and to illustrate the ethical problems raised by
intergenerational justice we will – one last time – discuss Rawls’s contribution
to it.
Alongside his two principles of (domestic) justice Rawls adds a ‘just savings
principle’ (Rawls, 1972: 284–93; 2001: 159–61). This principle distributes benefits
and burdens of cooperation between generations, but it is important to distinguish
contemporaneous and non-contemporaneous generations. The first can be easily
addressed by the two principles of justice: since agents in the original position are
choosing principles which are to determine their prospects over an entire lifetime,
conflicts between the different age groups do not raise special philosophical
problems, although more detailed social policies will have to address demographic
changes, such as the ‘ageing’ structure of Western societies, where there is a wors-
ening ratio of working age to retired people. Justice between non-contemporaneous
generations does, however, raise a major philosophical challenge: if we say it is
better to exist rather than not to exist then we have a duty to bring a particular
person into existence, but doing so may severely reduce per capita resources such
that we cannot assure that personthe minimum level of resources necessary to live
a decent life. And we cannot employ a veil of ignorance that denies individuals
knowledge of whether or not they will exist, for the one thing of which agents in
the original position cannot be denied knowledge is the fact of their existence.
Rawls argues that our duty to future generations consists in reproducing the
minimal conditions for a well-ordered society and we are not required to maximise
the position of the worst-off class of all time, only the contemporary worst-off class.
The just savings principle requires that each generation set aside resources for future
ones. It will involve positive measures such as investing in technology, as well as
negative policies such as not depleting finite natural resources. The similarity of
Rawls’s treatment of justice between peoples and between generations is significant:
the object of both the law of peoples and of the just savings principle is to create
and sustain the conditions for a well-ordered society. That is our duty to other
peoples and our duty to future generations.
What makes intergenerational justice between non-contemporaneous generations
such a radical challenge to Rawls’s theory is that what we do today will affect not
only the life prospects of future people, but whether they exist at all. There is a
consensus that population growth is a threat to the quality of life of future
generations, and we have a duty to see to it that such growth is checked. But to
whom is that duty owed? Imagine we have a fixed level of resources, and in World
1 there are 5 billion people, while in World 2 there are 20 billion people. Average
(per capita) resources will be higher in World 1 and its inhabitants are, therefore,
better off than the inhabitants of World 2. If these are the only two worlds, is it
the case that World 1 is the best of all possible worlds? It is not immediately obvious
that it is, for one consequence of living in World 1 is that a large number of people
would not be brought into existence. It is possible that none of World 1’s people
would have existed if a consequence of population control is that people defer having
children. Of course, uncontrolled population growth could result in some, or all,
of the inhabitants of World 1 not being brought into existence if in World 2
all children are born to, say, women under the age of 20, whereas in World 1 all
children are born to women over the age of 20, but our concern is with World 2.
Chapter 22 Global justice 497