truth is advanced in the competition of ideas. This assumes that there is a truth (or
set of truths), and the pursuit of that truth establishes an end for humankind. The
implication is that as we progress false beliefs lose their power over us, and we
increasingly come to hold the same true beliefs. What Mill fears is that as a result
of this process the beneficial aspects of the expression of false beliefs will be lost:
‘both teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there is no enemy
in the field’ (1991: 48). This suggests a distinction between the prevalence of true
beliefs, and how human beings hold those beliefs; it is essential that we understand
the reasons for our beliefs, otherwise the belief becomes ‘dead dogma’.
Finally, although there is a distinction between freedom of action and freedom
of expression, the line between them is fuzzy: some forms of expression are very
close to action. Mill argues that speech should not incite violence (1991: 55). This
brings us back to Fish’s rejection of the presumption in favour of freedom: here we
have a case of speech effectively being redefined as (physical) action so that it can
be limited. It should be noted, however, that Mill argues against incitement to
violence and not incitement to hatred. Defenders of strong rights to free speech
argue that to prohibit incitement to hatred amounts to censuring an attitude rather
than an action (see Hurd, 2001). In Mill’s own time there were laws against
‘sedition’, which was defined as speech which promoted ‘feelings of ill-will and
hostility between different classes of His Majesty’s subjects’ (this was established
in 1732 in the case R. v. Osborne, which involved libellous comments directed to
Jews in England). In the twentieth century most Western countries – with the
notable exception of the United States – have passed laws against inciting racial
hatred. But hatred and violence are distinct.
Freedom of action
In Chapter 3 of On LibertyMill discusses freedom of action and lifestyle. He
acknowledges that action cannot be as free as speech (1991: 62), but claims the
same reasons which show an opinion should be free demonstrate that an individual
should be free to put his opinions into practice, even if the action is foolish. The
only constraint is that the agent should not harm others.
In discussing freedom of action, Mill introduces the concept of individuality,
which requires a ‘variety of situations’ (1991: 64). Although children need to be
guided by those who have had experience of life, adults must be free to develop
their own lifestyle and values, and not be subject to custom, which is another word
for what we might today term ‘conformity’. People need to make choices, and
following custom is an evasion of choice. Following custom is analogous to holding
beliefs without understanding the reasons for those beliefs.
An aspect of individuality is originality. To be original is to bring something into
the world; this need not be a creation out of nothing, and it is quite possible that
other people have thought the same thoughts and performed the same actions. Nor
indeed must an action be uninfluenced by others; what makes an action original is
that a person consciously sets herself against custom and thinks for herself. It serves
a social function, for it provides role models for those who may be more timid
about thinking or acting in ways not supported by custom. Those who are original
are providing what Mill calls experiments in living, some of which may have bad,
Chapter 2 Freedom 41