to address the complexities of freedom we have discussed further liberty-limiting
principles: harm to self, offensiveness, harmless wrongdoing. It is for the reader to
assess the validity of these different principles, but it is clear that a discussion of
freedom must at least address the charge that the harm principle is inadequate as
an explanation of the limits of freedom. Freedom is certainly regarded as a positive
word and this may reflect an underlying belief not just of political theorists, but
also ordinary people, that although freedom must on occasion be limited we assume
freedom to be a good thing – there is a ‘presumption in favour of freedom’.
Questions
- If the protection of a person’s interests is so important should the state permit
a person to harm him- or herself? - If the protection of a person’s interests is so important should the state permit
a person to consent to be harmed by somebody else? - Should the fact that someone finds an expression or action offensive be a reason
for banning that expression or action? - Are some activities ‘intrinsically bad’ and therefore can they justifiably be banned?
References
Arneson, R. (1980) ‘Mill versus Paternalism’ Ethics90(4), 470–89.
Berlin, I. (1991) ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ in D. Miller (ed.) LibertyOxford: Oxford
University Press, 33–57.
Devlin, P. (1965) The Enforcement of MoralsLondon: Oxford University Press.
Ellis, A. (1984) ‘Offense and the Liberal Conception of Law’ Philosophy and Public Affairs
13(1), 3–23.
Feinberg, J. (1985) The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law, Vol. 2: Offense to OthersNew
York: Oxford University Press.
Finnis, J. (1980) Natural Law and Natural RightsOxford: Clarendon Press.
Fish, S. (1994) There Is No Such Thing as Free Speech and that Is a Good Thing, Too, New
York: Oxford University Press.
Foster, M. (1792) A Report on Crown Cases and Discourses on the Crown Law3rd edn,
London: M. Dodson.
Hurd, H. (2001) ‘Why Liberals Should Hate “Hate Crime Legislation” ’ Law and Philosophy
20(2), 215–32.
MacCallum, G. (1991) ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’ in D. Miller (ed.) LibertyOxford:
Oxford University Press, 100–22.
Mill, J.S. (1991) On Liberty and Other Essays(ed. John Gray) Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Miller, D. (1983) ‘Constraints on Freedom’ Ethics94, 66–86.
Nagel, T. (1970) The Possibility of AltruismPrinceton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sagarin, B.J., Cutler, B., Cutler, N., Lawler-Sagarin, K.A. and Matuszewich, L. (2009)
‘Hormonal Changes and Couple Bonding in Consensual Sadomasochistic Activity’
Archives of Sexual Behavior38(2), 186–200.
Scanlon, T. (1972) ‘A Theory of Freedom of Expression’ Philosophy and Public Affairs1(2),
204–26.
52 Part 1 Classical ideas