Fair access or special

privileges?

I

n 2003 the US Supreme Court ruled 5–4 in

favour of the University of Michigan’s Law

School policy that favoured underrepresented

minority groups, on the grounds that it served

the end of a diverse student body rather being a

racial quota system (which would have been

illegal). The majority judgement did, however,

state that in 25 years’ time the policy should be

unnecessary.

In 2006 the voters of Michigan narrowly

passed an amendment to the state constitution

banning the use of racial preferences in university

admissions policies. After being overturned by a

lower court the issue eventually – in 2014 – went

to the Supreme Court, which voted 6–2 in favour

of the right of states to determine their policies

on affirmative action, and thus the amendment

was deemed constitutional.

While the judgements of the Supreme Court

should not be interpreted straightforwardly as

a rejection of ‘positive discrimination’ (as one

element of ‘affirmative action’) they are part of

a broader pushback against the policy in the

United States. That policy raises interesting

questions about equality: does it entail discrimin-

ation? Are white students being treated unfairly?

Could it be interpreted as serving the end of

equality – that is, it is short-term discrimination

against one group in order to overcome deeply

entrenched unequal treatment of other groups?

(This is implied in the claim made in 2003 that

the policy should be redundant by 2028).

Michigan University students celebrate the 2003 Supreme Court ruling in favour

of racial preferences in university admissions

© Gregory Shamus/Reuters/Corbis