is being distributed, but rather the protectionof that liberty – if Sam is guaranteed
that he will not be thrown in jail for expressing views critical of the state, but Jane
is not given that guarantee, then clearly Sam and Jane are not being treated equally.
It is the guarantee – the right to free expression – rather than the expression itself
which is up for distribution. The separation between the guarantee (protection of
the capacity to choose; right to choose) and the action that is guaranteed does not
hold for all liberties. For example, voting – a ‘participatory’ rather than a ‘private’
or ‘personal’ right – is something which is clearly susceptible to directdistribution
in a way that the freedom to marry whoever you wish (a private right), or not get
married, is not (you can, of course, still choose not to vote). Some people can be
awarded more votes than others, or whole groups, such as workers or women, can
be denied the vote.
Do freedom and equality conflict?
Freedom (or liberty) necessarily entails choice, and individuals must make choices
for themselves. It would follow that the state cannot – and indeed should not –
attempt to control individual choice. At best, it can affect opportunities to make
choices through the distribution of rights. Does this mean that freedom and equality
necessarily conflict? In addressing this question we need to make a further distinction
to the one already made between choice and the capacity, or opportunity, to make
choices, so that we have a threefold distinction:
- Choice, which must be under the control of the individual, and for which the
individual can be held responsible. - Capacity, or opportunity for choice, which is not under the control of the
individual, and for which the individual should not be held responsible. - Outcome of the choices of individuals, where outcomes are determined to a large
degree by the interactive nature of choice.
Voting illustrates these points. You have a right to vote (2), which you may or
may not exercise (1), but even if you exercise that right and vote for a party or a
candidate, that choice may be less effective than another person’s choice (3). It is
less effective if your chosen party or candidate loses, but it might also be less effective
in a more subtle way. Imagine that there is just one issue dimension, say the distribu-
tion of wealth, with the left supporting high tax and a high degree of redistribution
of wealth, and the right supporting low taxes and a low degree of redistribution.
These represent the two extremes and there are various positions in between. Voters
are ranged along this axis from left to right. Consider the voter distributions shown
in Figures 3.1 and 3.2.
If there are just two parties then to maximise its vote a party has an incentive
to adopt a policy position as close to the median voter as possible. This is the case
even under Figure 3.2 where the median voter is in a tiny minority. The point is
that where you locate yourself relative to other voters will determine how effective
your vote is. Equality (or inequality) of outcome is therefore the result of an
interaction between the choices of many individuals, and it is impossible to protect
freedom of choice and at the same time guarantee equality of outcome.
Chapter 3 Equality 63