free to leave. Once again, conditionality is at work, but Cohen draws a different
conclusion to that of Nozick from this conditionality. Working with certain Marxist
assumptions, Cohen argues that a collectivist political order – one in which there
is a much more equal distribution of income – would, in effect, enable more people
to leave the room. In real-world terms, that means workers losing their subordinate
class position. Unlike Nozick, Cohen is concerned with the choices people actually
make, rather than their legal position vis-à-vis the state.Material equality
The example of inequality in the outcome of voting preferences illustrated problems
of distributing political power, and certainly political power is a major good, but
the most involved debates, both in everyday politics and in political theory, are
focused on the distribution of material goods, such as income, or education, or
health care. In liberal societies respect for equality before the law and equality of
liberties is fairly well embedded in the political culture – while there is controversy
over particularliberties, the majority of the population expresses support at least
for the principles. The same cannot be said for principles of material equality. As
was suggested in the section on Principles of Equality, while lip-service is paid to
equality of opportunity, that term encompasses a great many possible principles of
resource allocation, some of which entail radical state intervention in individuals’
lives. More often than not, what is being advocated is equal access to jobs and
services rather than equality of opportunity.Equal access
Equal access is sometimes referred to as ‘formal equality of opportunity’. Equal
access requires that positions which confer advantages on their holders should be
open to all, and that the criterion for award of those positions is qualification(s).
The qualifications required must be publicly acknowledged and intrinsically related
to the position. The list of illegitimate grounds for denial of access to a position
has gradually expanded, but in, for example, European Union countries, it would
include: gender, race, ethnic or national origin, creed, disability, family circumstance,
sexual orientation, political belief and social or economic class. This list, which is
not comprehensive, provides prima facie guidance on equal access.
It may be that certain of those characteristics are relevant to a job. For example,
the priesthood in the Catholic Church is restricted to men, and normally unmarried,
celibate, men. Employment in a women’s refuge would normally be restricted to
women. Legislation outlawing gender discrimination will contain clauses that permit
what appears, at first glance, to be discrimination, but which may, in fact, be
consistent with gender equality. We argued at the beginning of the chapter that
there was a presumption in favour of equal treatment – people should be treated
equally unless there were compelling grounds for unequal treatment. The nature of
work in a women’s refuge obviously provides compelling grounds, consistent with
gender equality: since the client group in a refuge is seriously disadvantaged, women66 Part 1 Classical ideas