employed in the refuge are working towards a more gender-equal society. However,
the restriction of the priesthood to men is more problematic and reveals the limits
to equal access; this may not be a criticism, for we can say that because equality
conflicts with other values, or principles, it necessarily has limits.
The compelling reason for setting aside gender equality in the case of the
priesthood is derived from the importance of the equal liberties (or freedoms), among
which is freedom of religion. Since freedom of religion requires that adherence to
a church is voluntary, the church could be said to constitute a private sphere in
which consenting adults should be free to act, and that includes being free to
discriminate. However, this argument, if extended to other spheres of life, would
corrode equal access: if churches can discriminate, then why not other employers?
It is to block off the claim that firms, universities, shops, sports centres and so on
are private spaces in which people should be free to discriminate, that anti-gender-
discrimination legislation defines the public sphere widely. Churches are given a
special exemption because of the interconnectedness of theological belief with
employment: the very nature of the institution requires an all-male priesthood. This
contrasts with, say, a restaurant where the customers may have a simple gut
preference for eating with people of their ‘own kind’, and so seek to deny access
to other groups. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to debate the correct limits between
the public and private spheres: if you are renting out your house for a year while
you go abroad, should you be free to choose who occupies the house, where that
choice might take the religion or ethnicity or marital status or sexual orientation
of putative tenants into account? Other people may justifiably condemn your
selection criteria, but does taking liberty seriously entail the recognition of a private
sphere in which a person is free to act on their preferences?
Equality of opportunity
Equal opportunity is a much stronger principle of equality than equal access: as the
name suggests, it requires that opportunities for acquiring favourable positions are
equalised. This principle is attractive across the political spectrum because it seems
to assume a meritocracy. For example, in Britain there is much popular debate about
the social composition of the student bodies in the highest-rated universities.
Students educated at fee-paying schools, or at state schools with relatively wealthy
catchment areas, make up a disproportionately large part of the student intake of
these universities. Even on the political right this situation is condemned: the
brightest students, rather than the wealthiest students, should get, it is felt, the most
desirable university places.
Although politicians disagree about the causes and the solutions to this situation,
there is agreement that equal access alone does not ensure a meritocratic outcome.
The difficulty is that an 18-year-old student has 18 years of education and social -
isation behind her – every day she has been presented with ‘opportunities’ that a
peer may have been denied. Those opportunities will include the emotional support
necessary to achieve self-confidence and a sense of self-worth, stimulating
conversation that enables her to develop a range of linguistic skills, interesting
foreign holidays and activities, the presence of books in the family home, the
Chapter 3 Equality 67