and creates resentment: if a person achieves a position through positive discrimi-
nation then others may not respect that person, while the apparently better-qualified
person passed over for the position will resent what seems an unfair selection
procedure. This objection, whether or not valid, does identify an important aspect
of equality (and inequality): there is an intersubjective dimension to human
relationships, such that inequality can result in a lack of respect. Where that
inequality seems unconnected to a person’s actions – that is, when you end up in
an unfavourable position regardless of what you have done – there is a feeling of
resentmentrather than simply disappointment. This suggests that equality should
not be understood merely as a mathematical question of who gets what, but is
intimately connected to other concepts, such as autonomy, responsibility and well-
being.
Equality of welfare versus equality of resources
More recent debates in political theory have focused on what exactly it is that is
being distributed when we talk about equal distribution of resources. What is the
‘metric’ of distribution? A distinction is drawn between welfare and resources.
Ronald Dworkin argues against equalising welfare and for equalising resources, so
long as resource inequality cannot be traced to decisions for which a person can be
held responsible. By welfare Dworkin means well-being, which is a subjective state
(it should not be confused with a belief in the welfare state: both welfarists and
resourcists could defend the idea of an extensive welfare state).
Dworkin asks us to imagine a man who has five children, each with a dominant
characteristic: (a) one is blind; (b) a playboy; (c) an ambitious politician; (d) a poet
with humble needs; (e) a sculptor who works with expensive material. What would
be a fair will for this man? A welfarist would say that the man should divide his
estate according to the needs and preferences of each. A resourcist, on the face of
things, would argue for an equal division. Welfarism looks like a strong theory of
equality, for it weighs what is intrinsically valuable rather than what is of merely
instrumental value: it is what we want to do, rather than what we have, that is
valuable. It also addresses the problem of disability: surely the blind son’s needs
are greater than those of the playboy? The difficulty is that a welfarist cannot
distinguish the preferences of each. If we extend the example and imagine the huge
range of preferences that people have, should we compensate the sexist for his
disappointment in living in a society that has strong laws against sexism? Should
we compensate a person because she has wildly unrealistic expectations? Or a
person who has expensive tastes? Or not compensate a person who is happy with
her lowly – and, arguably, oppressed – position in society? If welfarism is to make
sense we need a standard of what it is reasonableto want and, therefore, of when
it is reasonable to feel resentment or unhappiness about not getting or achieving
something. But once we impose a reasonableness standard we are moving away
from pure ‘welfare’. This is the problem with making the equalisation of happiness
the aim of public policy.
To develop an alternative – resourcist – theory of distribution Dworkin works
with two linked ideas: the hypothetical auction and the hypothetical insurance
system. We start with the hypothetical auction. We imagine a group of shipwrecked
Chapter 3 Equality 71