Motivation in the original position
Rawls attributes to people in the original position a certain psychology, or set of
motivations. It is important to stress that Rawls makes these assumptions for the
purposes of his theory; he does not claim that ‘real people’ – that is, people who
know their identities – have this psychology. In the original position the following
holds:- We allvalue certain things – what Rawls terms the (social) primary goods. The
primary goods are rights, liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth,
and the ‘bases of self-respect’. The primary goods are valuable to many different
ends, so if you choose a career trading in stocks and shares, or, alternatively,
living in a self-sufficient community on a remote island, you will value these
things (Rawls, 1972: 93). - You seek to maximiseyour share of the primary social goods (Rawls, 1972:
142). - You are not a gambler. Rawls tries to avoid assuming a particular attitude to
risk; nonetheless, the way the original position is set up would suggest that we
would be ‘risk-averse’ (Rawls, 2001: 106–7). - You are not envious of other people (Rawls, 1972: 143).
- We are mutually disinterested: that is, we are not interested in one another’s
welfare. You do know, however, that once the veil has been lifted you will have
family and friends who you do care about (Rawls, 1972: 144–5). - We live in a ‘closed society’ – entered at birth and exited at death. Again, this
point can easily be misunderstood. We do not know what principles of justice
will be chosen – we have not got to that point yet – but it is highly likely that
among the principles will be a right to emigrate. The reason Rawls assumes we
live our whole lives in one society is that it makes the choice of principles very
serious; John Locke is often interpreted – perhaps wrongly – as arguing that
remaining in a society and using the state’s resources – riding along the King’s
highway – constituted ‘tacit consent’ to the state. Rawls rejects that argument:
for an individual to leave a society and seek asylum elsewhere is such a major
step that deciding not to seek asylum cannot be taken to constitute consent to
the existing regime. This generates two motivational points: because the choice
of principles is a serious one, we would (a) not gamble our interests (a point
already made), and (b) we accept the chosen principles will be binding on us
once the veil has been lifted – Rawls terms the acceptance of the principles the
strains of commitment (Rawls, 1972: 145).
It has probably struck you that there is something odd about the motivation of
people in the original position. On the one hand, they are purely self-interested –
they seek to maximise their individual shares of the primary goods. On the other
hand, because they do not know their identities they are forcedto be impartial,
that is, each individual can only advance his or her interests by viewing the choice
of principles from the standpoint of each individual. Expressed metaphorically, we
have to put ourselves in each other’s shoes.
80 Part 1 Classical ideas