CHAPTER FouR • CiviL LibERTiEs 83
“Partial-birth” Abortion. In 2000, the Supreme Court again addressed the abor-
tion issue directly when it reviewed a Nebraska law banning “partial-birth” abortions. A
partial-birth abortion, which physicians call intact dilation and extraction, is a procedure
that can be used during the second trimester of pregnancy. Abortion rights advocates
claim that in limited circumstances the procedure is the safest way to perform an abortion
and that the government should never outlaw specific medical procedures. Opponents
argue that the procedure has no medical merit and that it ends the life of a fetus that
might be able to live outside the womb. The Supreme Court invalidated the Nebraska law
on the ground that the law could be used to ban other abortion procedures and contained
no provisions for protecting the health of the pregnant woman.^39
In 2003, legislation similar to the Nebraska statute was passed by the U.S. Congress
and signed into law by President George W. Bush. In 2007, the Supreme Court, with sev-
eral changes in membership since the 2000 ruling, upheld the federal law in a five-to-four
vote, effectively reversing its position on partial-birth abortions.^40
Privacy Rights and the “Right to die”
A 1976 case involving Karen Ann Quinlan was one of the first publicized right-to-die
cases.^41 The parents of Quinlan, a young woman who had been in a coma for nearly a
year and who had been kept alive during that time by a respirator, wanted her respirator
removed. The ruling of the New Jersey Supreme Court, In re Quinlan, stated that the right
to privacy includes the right of a patient to refuse treatment and that patients unable to
speak can exercise that right through a family member or guardian. In 1990, the Supreme
Court took up the issue. In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,^42 the Court
stated that a patient’s life-sustaining treatment can be withdrawn at the request of a fam-
ily member only if there is “clear and convincing evidence” that the patient did not want
such treatment.
What if There is No Living Will? Since the 1976 Quinlan decision, most states have
enacted laws permitting people to designate their wishes concerning life- sustaining pro-
cedures in “living wills” or durable health-care powers of attorney. These laws and the
Supreme Court’s Cruzan decision have resolved the right-to-die controversy for cases in
which a living will has been drafted. Disputes are still possible if there is no living will.
An example is the case of Terri Schiavo. After the Florida woman had been in a per-
sistent vegetative state for over a decade, her husband sought to have her feeding tube
removed on the basis of oral statements that she would not want her life prolonged in such
circumstances. Schiavo’s parents fought this move in court but lost on the ground that a
spouse, not a parent, is the appropriate legal guardian for a married person. Although the
Florida legislature passed a law allowing then-governor Jeb Bush to overrule the courts,
the state supreme court held that the law violated the state constitution.^43 The federal
courts agreed with the Florida state courts and Schiavo died shortly thereafter.
Physician-Assisted suicide. In the 1990s, another issue surfaced: Do privacy rights
include the right of terminally ill people to end their lives through physician-assisted sui-
cide? Until 1996, the courts consistently upheld state laws that prohibited this practice.
- Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
- Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
- 70 N.J. 10 (1976).
- 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
- Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2004).
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