48 By calling this kind of imagination‘sensory’, I do not wish to obscure significant differences
between actually seeing the horses and having an imaginary visual image of the horses. Sartre
(2004), for example, takes great pains to highlight such differences.
49 One could (visually) imagine years passing, but it would require the assistance of a certain kind
of (authorial) imagination to do so. Take, for example, the middle section of Woolf’sTo the
Lighthouse.
50 Poetics48b.
51 Gendler (2003) gives examples and discusses empirical evidence.
52 See especially Walton (1990: 11–69). Indeed, Walton uses (and freely admits to using) many
familiar words in an unfamiliar, technical sense, including‘fiction’(and‘fictional’),‘prop’,‘repre-
sentation’. Music, for example, counts as a prop. We discuss his view as it relates to art and
emotion in Chapter 6.
53 That these two kinds ofmimesisare analytically distinct is uncontroversial. Woodruff (2008)
posits a unifying structure tomimesisin general, which appeals to the‘natural effect’of the ori-
ginal object (although I note, in passing, that I am sceptical as to whether all original objects could
be said to have a‘natural effect’in this sense); Belfiore (1984) argues for a unified account of
mimesisin Plato’sThe Republic.
54 Gombrich (1978: 8).
55 Sartre (2004: 28), makes a similar point about a stage impressionist, impersonating Maurice
Chevalier: the more we look for particular resemblances, theharderit is to imagine the impressionist
as Chevalier.
56 Lear, V.4.11–23.
57 Walton (1990: 7), Woodruff (2008: 124) and others certainly take this view ofmimesis.46 From the World to the Stage