is tosay,religionisin generala matter offantasy, not knowledge.Itis onlywhen
religious principles do not“remain merely principles”^16 – that is, when they are
taken seriously and urged with zealotry in a work (a practice that Hume
identifies with Roman Catholicism in particular)–that the work itself is disfig-
ured. This is a way on Hume’s part of radically deemphasizing the claims of art
to instruct us on any matters of value in human life and of emphasizing instead
that art is a matter of pleasure more than of knowledge.
Hence Hume instead casts pleasure in moving art as a function of elo-
quence, artfulness, and surface, not of insight. But while there is real pleas-
ure in these things, in the end Hume’s account is faithless to the depth and
detail of our engagement with art. Alex Neill notes that Hume in fact offers
no“sustained thought about tragedy. In fact, and despite the essay’s title,
Hume does not appear to have been particularly interested in tragedy at
all.”^17 When we think seriously about what it is like to watch or readHamlet
orOedipus at ColonusorThe Man with a Flower in his Mouth, then it is hard to
believe that eloquence is the sole or primary focus of our attention. As Colin
Lyas rightly remarks,“we are interested in far more than the looks and
appearances of art.”^18 We are also interested in how a work presents a
subject matter as a focus for thought and emotional attitude, distinctively
fused to the imaginative exploration of material.
Making-believe and quasi-emotions: Walton, Levinson, and Feagin
Kendall Walton likewise denies (1) but proposes a different explanation of what
moves and pleases us in art.“We do not actually pity Willy Loman or grieve for
Anna Karenina or admire Superman...nor do we feel contempt for Iago or
worry about Tom Sawyer and Becky lost in the cave.”^19 There are, after all, no
really existing beings toward whom we might feel such emotions. Moreover, we
lack the disposition to action that is typically present with full-fledged emo-
tions.“What is pity or anger that is never to be acted on?,”^20 Walton asks.
(^16) Ibid., p. 268.
(^17) Alex Neill,“Hume’s‘Singular Phenomenon,’”British Journal of Aesthetics39, 2 (April 1999),
pp. 112–25 at p. 115.
(^18) Lyas,Aesthetics, p. 199. (^19) Walton,Mimesis as Make-Believe, p. 249.
(^20) Ibid., p. 196.
Art and emotion 207