novel something of ethical significance: that here is a way of life with rich,
interrelated virtues and vices, presenting problems that we feel ourselves to
share (caring intensely but fleetingly and self-indulgently vs. routine
decency) and that are to be worked out, yet we know not how.
This kind of clarification of complexities in human life and of emotional
response to them, yet without arriving at any directly guiding moral conclu-
sion or plan for action, is what Amy Mullin has in mind in suggesting that
works of art may enable“morally significant imagining”^102 that is different
from (but also related to) moral theorizing. I have argued that any exemplary
achievement of human value, in art and in life,“remains marked by particu-
larity”^103 and one-sidedness, given the complexities of any form of social life
and the antagonisms that run through it. As a result, the pursuit of specific-
ally detailed self-understanding within the framework of a given social
context“must be an activity, not a body of knowledge.”^104 The clarifying
imaginative work of art is a central aspect of this ongoing activity, as we
attempt to work through our situation and prospects, attempting to bring
standing moral commitment and principle to their fullest and fittest expres-
sion within complex and antagonized situations in which recipes alone will
not avail us. The working-through that successful art accomplishes is both
humanly significant and not a matter of direct theoretical argument for or
against either a moral formula or a specific course of action. This explains
why it strikes us, rightly, as all at once different from moral theorizing,
insulated as a distinct imaginative activity from“the rest of life”where
action must be taken, and yet relevant to life. Karen Hanson eloquently
describes both the practical moral difficulties that artistic imagining
addresses and how it addresses themasartistic imagining, not theory.
We in fact cannot, in our conduct, honor all the moral ideals that may, in
abstract thought and even in the lives of others, seem worthy, admirable, or in
some way attractive. This is not because–or not alone because–of
pervasive weakness of the will. The more fundamental problem is the practical
incompatibility of, the friction between, a wide variety of recognized, or
tempting, ideals...Art’s capacity to keep alive certain moral perspectives,
even if these views diverge radically from our own present moral outlook, can(^102) Mullin,“Evaluating Art,”p. 137A.
(^103) Eldridge,On Moral Personhood, p. 182.
(^104) Ibid., p. 188.
Art and morality 251