of conscious experience and of depiction as a practice are somewhat slighted
in his view. Is it so clear that, as Lopes argues,^51 recognition, whether of
depicted content or of ordinary objects, can be fully unconscious, as in cases
of blindsight? Against Lopes, we might first distinguish two senses of visual
recognition: differential responsiveness to different objects (depicted or
actual), such as a frog might possess in snapping normally at a fly rather
than a floating cherry blossom; and conscious and partially articulated
awareness, such as is had only by creatures who possess a language. Argu-
ably, our ability to recognize depicted subject matters involves visual recog-
nition in the latter sense, as does our normal visual recognition of objects
once we have acquired language. At any rate, it is far from clear that there is
recognition of depicted content, recognition of S in M, in the lives of infants
prior to and independent of learning language. We seem normally to learn
languages and pictures together.
Building on worries like these, but also strongly influenced by Lopes and by
contemporary vision research, Michael Newell has developed a mixed theory
that makes a place for both unconscious visual recognition and conscious visual
experience in the recognition of depicted subject matters. Newell proposes that
“A manufactured surface, X, depicts Y if and only if (i) X can occasion non-
veridical seeing of Y, and (ii) X’s method of manufacture reliably conveys infor-
mation about Y inthis way.”^52 Seeing, whether veridical or nonveridical, always
involves, according to Newell,“three related elements: (i) stimulation of the
visual system, (ii) engagement of the subject’s ability [not necessarily conscious]
to visually recognize X, and (iii) a [conscious] visual experience of X, which is the
experience of seeing X.”^53 In the case of seeing S in M, M, the marked surface, is
seen veridically (we are visually aware that we are looking at a marked surface),
andS is seen nonveridically (the depicted object is not actually present). It is the
marked surface M (Y in Newell’s terminology) which serves as the stimulus to
the visual system and as the object of veridical recognition of itasa marked
surface, while simultaneously serving as the stimulus for a nonveridical recog-
nition of S (X inNewell’s terminology), the depicted object that isn’t really there.
“Pictorial seeing-in...involves the veridical experience of seeing the picture
surface, and the nonveridical experience of seeing the depicted subject,”^54 as in
Wollheim’s account of twofoldness.(^51) Seeibid., p. 177. (^52) Newell,What is a Picture?,p.65. (^53) Ibid., p. 44.
(^54) Ibid., p. 30.
42 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art