not from copying or aping (Nachmachung, Nachaffung), but from taking up and
freely imitating (Nachahmung), following after, or being inspired by prior
artistic work.^26 Geniuscannot describe or indicate scientifically how it brings its product into
being...[T]he author of a product that he owes to his genius does not know
himself how the ideas for it come to him, and also does not have it in his
power to think up such things at will or according to plan, and to
communicate to others precepts that would put them in a position to produce
similar works.^27
In thus springing forth chthonically in and through the genius in its maker,
rather than according to any definite plan, the successful work of art resem-
bles such sublime, terrifying yet invigorating natural phenomena as over-
hanging rocks, storms at sea, and raging torrents. Arguably Kant overstates
the point, in that makers of art must have some rough conception of what
they are trying to do (compose a sonata or paint a still life or write a novel,
say). Moreover, the ability to produce art successfully canbe cultivated
through training and practice. But (like Aristotle in remarking that some-
times rules can be broken successfully) Kant captures our sense that in
artistic production some free experimentation with the materials and formal
possibilities of a medium normally takes place. This free experimentation or
improvisation, beyond mere aping, is a source of our interest in the artistic
product. The work of art and the power of free production that it evidences
inspire us, its audience. Our own cognitive powers are“animated,”^28 as we
are brought to feel that we have like powers that might likewise be brought
to expression in fully achieved, exemplary action and its products.
Yet despite being chthonically original in stemming from natural genius, the
genuine work of art must also beexemplary.“Since there can also be original
nonsense”^29 that is not art, the genuine work of art must be intelligible or make
sense.^30 While being original, the products of genius“must at the same time be(^26) Seeibid., §47, p. 188; see also §49, p. 196, on aping and copying versus inspiration and
serving as a model.
(^27) Ibid., §46, p. 187.
(^28) Seeibid., §12, p. 107 and §48, p. 194, for references to animation.
(^29) Ibid., §46, p. 186.
(^30) For an excellent survey of the theme of art as original sense as that theme appears in
both Kant and Wordsworth, see Timothy Gould,“The Audience of Originality: Kant and
60 An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art