INTRODUCTION 1209
all systems of thought contain “traces” of that which they define themselves
against. Thus, whereas many philosophers have thought literature merely sugar-
coated philosophy, Derrida has reversed this hierarchy to say that the discourse of
philosophy is merely literary medicine—an assumption that is hard for many to
swallow. For Derrida, all writing is reduced (or elevated) to the same level, with
no privileging of one genre as more “meaning-ful” than another. This may explain
why deconstruction—with its close reading of texts to unearth language working
against itself—made its greatest impact in literature, rather than in philosophy.
But what about Derrida’s writings themselves—do they not represent a
conceptual order, an attempt to communicate “meaning”? Derrida goes to great
pains to avoid the systemization of his own thought, constantly inventing new
terms to destabilize his readers’ sense that they understand his “philosophy.” In the
meantime, although he works to expose the failures of language to make present
meaning, he acknowledges that, since language is all we have, he must situate him-
self inside a system even as he is breaking it apart. He signals this paradox, or
aporia,of language by borrowing a technique from Heidegger, who simultane-
ously included and deleted the word Being in his works by placing an Xover it:
Being. Derrida crosses out certain metaphysically loaded words, putting them
“under erasure.” He asserts the inadequacy of a signifier like nature to have a defin-
itive meaning, while also acknowledging that thought cannot operate without the
term. Derrida demonstrates that his own writing—like everyone else’s—is not
innocent, that it cannot become a coherent theoretical system corresponding to
reality. Derrida has therefore been called a nihilist. His defenders, however, call
this accusation inaccurate. Derrida never denies the existence of an Absolute; he
only asserts the impossibility of putting the Absolute into words.
For general overviews of Derrida, see Christopher Norris,Derrida(Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1987); Christopher Johnson,Derrida(Lon-
don: Routledge, 1999); James K.A. Smith,Jacques Derrida: Live Theory
(London: Continuum, 2005); Jason Powell,Jacques Derrida: A Biography(Lon-
don: Continuum, 2006); Barry Stocker,Derrida on Deconstruction(London:
Routledge, 2006); Julian Wolfreys,Derrida: A Guide for the Perplexed(London:
Continuum, 2007); Leslie Hill,The Cambridge Introduction to Jacques Derrida
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); and Mark Dooley and Liam
Kavanagh,The Philosophy of Derrida(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2007). For a recent biography, see Jason Powell,Jacques Derrida: A
Biography(London: Continuum, 2007). Allan Megill,Prophets of Extremity:
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida(Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1985); Diane P. Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer, eds.,Dialogue and
Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter(Albany, NY: SUNY Press,
1989); Roy Boyne,Foucault and Derrida: The Other Side of Reason(London:
Unwin Hyman, 1990); Simon Critchley,The Ethics of Deconstruction: Derrida &
Levinas(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992); and John McCumber,Philosophy and
Freedom: Derrida, Rorty, Habermas, Foucault(Indianapolis: Indiana University
Press, 2000) provide comparative studies. John D. Caputo,The Prayers and Tears
of Jacques Derrida: Religion without Religion(Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1997); and Sean Gaston,The Impossible Mourning of Jacques Derrida