Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

METAPHYSICS(BOOKI) 149


are made out of the forms in any of the usual ways that is meant. And to say that they are
patterns and the other things participate in them is to speak without content and in poetic
metaphors. For what is the thing that is at work, looking off toward the forms? And it is
possible for anything whatever to be or become like something without being an image
of it, so that whether Socrates is or is not, one might become like Socrates, and it is obvi-
ous that it would be the same even if Socrates were everlasting. And there would be more
than one pattern for the same thing, and so too with the forms; for example, of a human
being, there would be animal and at the same time two footed, as well as human being
itself. What’s more, the forms will be patterns not only of the perceptible things but also
of themselves, such as the form genus,since it is a genus of forms, and so the same thing
would be a pattern and an image.
Further, one would think it was impossible for the thinghood and that of which it
is the thinghood to be separate: so how could the forms be the thinghood of things if
they are separate? In the Phaedoit is put this way: that the forms are responsible for
both being and becoming. Yet even if there are forms, still the things that partake of
them do not come into being if there is not something that causes motion, and many
other things do come into being, such as a house or a ring, of which we say there are no
forms. So it is clear that the other things too admit of being and becoming by means of
the sort of causes which produce the ones just mentioned.
Again, if the forms are numbers, how would they be causes? Is it because the
beings are various numbers, this number human being, that one Socrates, this other
one Callias? Why then are those the causes of these? And it will make no difference if the
ones are everlasting and the others not. But if it is because the things here are ratios of
numbers, as harmony is, it is clear that there is some one thing of which they are ratios.
So if this is something, as material, it is apparent that the numbers themselves will also
be particular ratios of one thing to another. I mean, for example, if Callias is a ratio
among numbers consisting of fire, earth, water, and air, then the form too will be a num-
ber consisting of certain other underlying things, and human being itself, whether or not
it is a sort of number, will still be a ratio among numbers of something,and not a number,
nor would it be on this account a certain number. What’s more, from many numbers
comes one number, but in what way is one form made of forms? But if it is not made of
them but of the things that are in a number, as in ten thousand, how does it stand with the
units? For if they are homogeneous, many absurdities will follow, and also if they are not
homogeneous, either one the same as another or a whole group the same as a whole
group; for in what respect will they differ if they are without attributes? For these things
are neither reasonable nor in agreement with a thoughtful viewing of the matter.
And on top of this, it is necessary to construct a different kind of number, with
which the art of arithmetic is concerned, and all those things that are said by some to be
in-between; in what way arethey and from what sources? Or by what cause are they
between the things here and those things? Again, each of the units in the number two
comes from some more primary dyad, yet this is impossible. Again, by what cause is a
number one thing when it is taken all together? Again, on top of the things that have
been said, if the units are to differ, it would behoove one to speak in the same way as
those who say there are four, or two, elements. For each of these people speaks of as an
element not what is common, such as body, but fire or earth, whether body is something
common or not. But as it is, one speaks as though the one were homogeneous, just like
fire or water; and if this is so, the numbers will not be independent things. But it is clear
that, if there is something that is the one itself, and this is a source,oneis meant in more
than one way, for otherwise it is impossible.


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