Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

ON THESOUL(BOOKII) 161


For this reason, those who think the soul neither has being without a body, nor is
any sort of body, get hold of it well, for it is not a body but something that belongs to a
body, and this is why it is present in a body and in a body of a certain kind, and those
earlier thinkers did not think well who stuck it into a body without also distinguishing
which bodies and of what sort, even though there is no evidence that any random thing
admits just any random thing within it. And this happens in accord with reason, since
the being-at-work-staying-itself of each thing naturally comes to be present in some-
thing that isit in potency and in the material appropriate to it. That, then, the soul is a
certain being-at-work-staying-itself and articulation of that which has the potency to be
in that way, is clear from these things.



  1. Now of the potencies of the soul, all of those that have been mentioned belong
    to some living things, as we said, while to others some of them belong, and to still others
    only one. The potencies we are speaking of are those for nutrition, perception, motion
    with respect to place, and thinking things through. And in plants the nutritive potency
    alone is present, while in other living things this is present along with the perceptive. But
    if the perceptive potency is present, then so is that of appetite, for appetite consists of
    desire and spiritedness and wishing, while all animals have at least one of the senses, that
    of touch, and in that in which sense perception is present there are also pleasure and pain,
    as well as pleasant and painful sensations, and where these are present so is desire, since
    this is an appetite for the pleasant. Besides, they have a perception of food, for touch is
    the sense that perceives food since all animals are nourished by what is dry or moist and
    warm or cold, of which the sense is touch, though incidentally it is perceptive of other
    things. For neither sound nor color nor smell contributes anything to nourishment, but
    the flavor that comes from food is one of the things perceived by touch. Hunger and thirst
    are desires for, in the former case, what is dry and warm, and in the latter, what is moist
    and cold, while the flavor is a way of making these pleasant. One must get clear about
    these things later, but for now let this much be said, that those living things that have
    touch also have appetite; it is unclear whether they must also have imagination, but this
    needs to be examined later. And in some living things, in addition to these potencies,
    there is present also that for motion with respect to place, and in others also the potency
    for thinking things through as well as intellect, as in human beings and any other living
    things there might be that are of that sort or more honorable.
    So it is clear that there could be a single account of soul in the same way as of
    geometrical figure; for neither in that case is there any figure aside from the triangle and
    those that follow in succession, nor in this is there any soul aside from the ones dis-
    cussed. But even in the case of the figures, there could be a common account which
    would fit them all, but would be appropriate to none of them in particular, and similarly
    in the case of the souls that were discussed. Hence it would be ridiculous to inquire after
    the common account, both in the one case and in the other, which would not be the par-
    ticular account of any thing there is, nor apply to any proper and indivisible kind, while
    neglecting an account that is of that sort. (For what applies to the soul is just about the
    same as what concerns geometrical figures, for always in the one next in succession
    there is present in potency the previous one, both in figures and in things with souls, as
    the triangle is in the quadrilateral and the nutritive potency in the perceptive one.)
    Therefore, for each kind, one needs to inquire what the soul of each is, as for a plant, a
    human, and a wild animal. And why they are in this sort of succession must be consid-
    ered. For without the nutritive potency there is no perceptive potency, while the nutritive
    is present in separation from the perceptive in plants. Again, without the sense of touch


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