NICOMACHEANETHICS(BOOKVI) 195
object either of science, of art, or of practical wisdom. For what is known scientifically
is demonstrable, whereas art and practical wisdom are concerned with things that can
be other than they are. Nor are these fundamental principles the objects of theoretical
wisdom: for it is the task of a man of theoretical wisdom to have a demonstration for
certain truths.* Now, if scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, theoretical wisdom, and
intelligence are the faculties by which we attain truth and by which we are never
deceived both in matters which can and in those matters which cannot be other than
they are; and if three of these—I am referring to practical wisdom, scientific knowl-
edge, and theoretical wisdom—cannot be the faculty in question, we are left with the
conclusion that it is intelligence that apprehends fundamental principles.
- (e) Theoretical Wisdom:We attribute “wisdom” in the arts to the most precise
and perfect masters of their skills: we attribute it to Phidias as a sculptor in marble and
to Polycletus as a sculptor in bronze. In this sense we signify by “wisdom” nothing but
excellence of art or craftsmanship. However, we regard some men as being wise in
general, not in any partial sense or in some other particular respect, as Homer says in
the Margites:
The gods let him not be a digger or a ploughman nor wise at anything.It is, therefore, clear, that wisdom must be the most precise and perfect form of
knowledge. Consequently, a wise man must not only know what follows from funda-
mental principles, but he must also have true knowledge of the fundamental principles
themselves. Accordingly, theoretical wisdom must comprise both intelligence and sci-
entific knowledge. It is science in its consummation, as it were, the science of the
things that are valued most highly.
For it would be strange to regard politics or practical wisdom as the highest kind
of knowledge, when in fact man is not the best thing in the universe. Surely, if
“healthy” and “good” mean one thing for men and another for fishes, whereas “white”
and “straight” always mean the same, “wise” must mean the same for everyone, but
“practically wise” will be different. For each particular being ascribes practical wis-
dom in matters relating to itself to that thing which observes its interests well, and
it will entrust itself to that thing. That is the reason why people attribute practical
wisdom even to some animals—to all those which display a capacity of forethought in
matters relating to their own life.
It is also evident that theoretical wisdom is not the same as politics. If we are to
call “theoretical wisdom” the knowledge of what is helpful to us, there will be many
kinds of wisdom. There is no single science that deals with what is good for all living
things any more than there is a single art of medicine dealing with everything that is, but
a different science deals with each particular good. The argument that man is the best of
living things makes no difference. There are other things whose nature is much more
divine than man’s: to take the most visible example only, the constituent parts of the
universe.
Our discussion has shown that theoretical wisdom comprises both scientific
knowledge and [apprehension by the] intelligence of things which by their nature are
valued most highly. That is why it is said that men like Anaxagoras and Thales have
351141 a510152025301141 b*In other words, the undemonstrable first or fundamental principles cannot be the proper and
complete object of theoretical wisdom: as the next chapter shows, they are included within its sphere.