196 ARISTOTLE
theoretical but not practical wisdom: when we see that they do not know what is advan-
tageous to them, we admit that they know extraordinary, wonderful, difficult, and super-
human things, but call their knowledge useless because the good they are seeking is not
human.
Practical wisdom, on the other hand, is concerned with human affairs and with
matters about which deliberation is possible. As we have said, the most characteristic
function of a man of practical wisdom is to deliberate well: no one deliberates about
things that cannot be other than they are, nor about things that are not directed to some
end, an end that is a good attainable by action. In an unqualified sense, that man is good
at deliberating who, by reasoning, can aim at and hit the best thing attainable to man by
action.
Nor does practical wisdom deal only with universals. It must also be familiar
with particulars, since it is concerned with action and action has to do with particulars.
This explains why some men who have no scientific knowledge are more adept in
practical matters, especially if they have experience, than those who do have scientific
knowledge. For if a person were to know that light meat is easily digested, and hence
wholesome, but did not know what sort of meat is light, he will not produce health,
whereas someone who knows that poultry is light and wholesome is more likely to
produce health.*
Now, practical wisdom is concerned with action. That means that a person should
have both [knowledge of universals and knowledge of particulars] or knowledge of par-
ticulars rather [than knowledge of universals]. But here, too, it seems, there is a supreme
and comprehensive science involved, [i.e., politics].- Practical Wisdom and Politics:Political wisdom and practical wisdom are both
the same characteristic, but their essential aspect is not the same. There are two kinds of
wisdom concerning the state: the one, which acts as practical wisdom supreme and
comprehensive, is the art of legislation; the other, which is practical wisdom as dealing
with particular facts, bears the name which, [in everyday speech,] is common to both
kinds, politics, and it is concerned with action and deliberation. For a decree, [unlike a
law, which lays down general principles,] is a matter for action, inasmuch as it is the last
step [in the deliberative process]. That is why only those who make decrees are said to
engage in politics, for they alone, like workmen, “do” things.**
It is also commonly held that practical wisdom is primarily concerned with one’s
own person, i.e., with the individual, and it is this kind that bears the name “practical
wisdom,” which properly belongs to others as well. The other kinds are called house-
hold management, legislation, and politics, the last of which is subdivided into deliber-
ative and judicial.***
Now, knowing what is good for oneself is, to be sure, one kind of knowledge; but
it is very different from the other kinds. A man who knows and concerns himself with
51015202530*The point here is that, in practical matters, a man who knows by experience that poultry is whole-
some is likely to be more successful than a man who only has the scientific knowledge that light meat is
digestible and therefore wholesome, without knowing the particular fact that poultry is light meat.
**I.e., lawgivers and other men who are concerned with political wisdom in the supreme and compre-
hensive sense are not generally regarded as being engaged in politics. The analogy to workmen represents of
course not Aristotle’s view, which vigorously distinguishes action from production, but rather reflects a wide-
spread attitude toward politics.
***In Athens, “deliberative” politics referred to matters debated in the Council and the Popular
Assembly, and “judicial” politics to matters argued in the lawcourts.1142 a