Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

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NICOMACHEANETHICS(BOOKVI) 201


practical wisdom makes us use the right means. The fourth part of the soul, the nutri-
tive, does not have a virtue [which makes man fulfill his proper function,] since it does
not play any role in the decision to act or not to act.
Finally, the argument has to be met that our ability to perform noble and just acts is
in no way enhanced by practical wisdom. We have to begin a little further back and take
the following as our starting point. It is our contention that people may perform just acts
without actually being just men, as in the case of people who do what has been laid down
by the laws but do so either involuntarily or through ignorance or for an ulterior motive,
and not for the sake of performing just acts. [Such persons are not just men] despite the
fact that they act the way they should, and perform all the actions which a morally good
man ought to perform. On the other hand, it seems that it is possible for a man to be of
such a character that he performs each particular act in such a way as to make him a good
man—I mean that his acts are due to choice and are performed for the sake of the acts
themselves. Now, it is virtue which makes our choice right. It is not virtue, however, but
a different capacity, which determines the steps which, in the nature of the case, must be
taken to implement this choice.
We must stop for a moment to make this point clearer. There exists a capacity called
“cleverness,” which is the power to perform those steps which are conducive to a goal we
have set for ourselves and to attain that goal. If the goal is noble, cleverness deserves
praise; if the goal is base, cleverness is knavery. That is why men of practical wisdom are
often described as “clever” and “knavish.” But in fact this capacity [alone] is not practical
wisdom, although practical wisdom does not exist without it. Without virtue or excellence,
this eye of the soul, [intelligence,] does not acquire the characteristic of practical wisdom:
that is what we have just stated and it is obvious. For the syllogisms which express the
principles initiating action run: “Since the end, or the highest good, is such-and-
such...”—whatever it may be; what it really is does not matter for our present argument.
But whatever the true end may be, only a good man can judge it correctly. For wickedness
distorts and causes us to be completely mistaken about the fundamental principles of
action. Hence it is clear that a man cannot have practical wisdom unless he is good.



  1. Practical Wisdom and Moral Virtue:Accordingly, we must also re-examine
    virtue or excellence. Virtue offers a close analogy to the relation that exists between
    practical wisdom and cleverness. Just as these two qualities are not identical but
    similar, so we find the same relation between natural virtue and virtue in the full sense.
    It seems that the various kinds of character inhere in all of us, somehow or other, by
    nature. We tend to be just, capable of self-control, and to show all our other character
    traits from the time of our birth. Yet we still seek something more, the good in a fuller
    sense, and the possession of these traits in another way. For it is true that children and
    beasts are endowed with natural qualities or characteristics, but it is evident that with-
    out intelligence these are harmful. This much, to be sure, we do seem to notice: as in
    the case of a mighty body which, when it moves without vision, comes down with a
    mighty fall because it cannot see, so it is in the matter under discussion. If a man acts
    blindly, i.e., using his natural virtue alone, he will fail; but once he acquires intelli-
    gence, it makes a great difference in his action. At that point, the natural characteristic
    will become that virtue in the full sense which it previously resembled.
    Consequently, just as there exist two kinds of quality, cleverness and practical
    wisdom, in that part of us which forms opinions, [i.e., in the calculative element,] so
    also there are two kinds of quality in the moral part of us, natural virtue and virtue in the
    full sense. Now virtue in the full sense cannot be attained without practical wisdom.


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