202 ARISTOTLE
That is why some people maintain that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom,
and why Socrates’ approach to the subject was partly right and partly wrong. He was
wrong in believing that all the virtues are forms of wisdom, but right in saying that there
is no virtue without wisdom. This is indicated by the fact that all the current definitions
of virtue,* after naming the characteristic and its objects, add that it is a characteristic
“guided by right reason.” Now right reason is that which is determined by practical
wisdom. So we see that these thinkers all have some inkling that virtue is a characteris-
tic of this kind, namely, a characteristic guided by practical wisdom.
But we must go a little beyond that. Virtue or excellence is not only a characteristic
which is guided by right reason, but also a characteristic which is united with right reason;
and right reason in moral matters is practical wisdom.** In other words, while Socrates
believed that the virtues arerational principles—he said that all of them are forms of
knowledge—we, on the other hand, think that they are united witha rational principle.
Our discussion, then, has made it clear that it is impossible to be good in the full sense
of the word without practical wisdom or to be a man of practical wisdom without moral
excellence or virtue. Moreover, in this way we can also refute the dialectical argument which
might be used to prove that the virtues exist independently of one another. The same indi-
vidual, it might be argued, is not equally well-endowed by nature for all the virtues, with the
result that at a given point he will have acquired one virtue but not yet another. In the case of
the natural virtues this may be true, but it cannot happen in the case of those virtues which
entitle a man to be called good in an unqualified sense. For in the latter case, as soon as he
possesses this single virtue of practical wisdom, he will also possess all the rest.
It is now clear that we should still need practical wisdom, even if it had no bear-
ing on action, because it is the virtue of a part of our soul. But it is also clear that [it does
have an important bearing on action, since] no choice will be right without practical
wisdom and virtue. For virtue determines the end, and practical wisdom makes us do
what is conducive to the end.
Still, practical wisdom has no authority over theoretical wisdom or the better part
of our soul*** any more than the art of medicine has authority over health. [Just as med-
icine does not use health but makes the provisions to secure it, so] practical wisdom does
not use theoretical wisdom but makes the provisions to secure it. It issues commands to
attain it, but it does not issue them to wisdom itself. To say the contrary would be like
asserting that politics governs the gods, because it issues commands about everything in
the state, [including public worship].BOOKVII
- Moral Strength and Moral Weakness: Their Relation to Virtue and Vice and Current
Beliefs about Them:We have to make a fresh start now by pointing out that the qualities of
character to be avoided are three in kind: vice, moral weakness, and brutishness. The oppo-
202530351145 a
510*The reference is to the doctrines of Plato’s successors in the Academy.
**I.e., right reason is not only an external standard of action, but it also lives in us and makes us
virtuous.
***That is, the scientific or cognitive part in the soul, the rational element which grasps necessary and
permanent truths.15