NICOMACHEANETHICS(BOOKVII) 203
sites of two of these are obvious: one is called virtue or excellence and the other moral
strength. The most fitting description of the opposite of brutishness would be to say that it is
superhuman virtue, a kind of heroic and divine excellence; just as Homer has Priam say
about Hector that he was of surpassing excellence:
for he did not seem like one who was child of a mortal man, but of god.Therefore, if, as is said, an excess of virtue can change a man into a god, the character-
istic opposed to brutishness must evidently be something of this sort. For just as vice
and virtue do not exist in brute beasts, no more can they exist in a god. The quality of
gods is something more worthy of honor than [human] virtue or excellence, and the
quality of a brute is generically different from [human] vice.
If it is rare to find a man who is divine—as the Spartans, for example, customar-
ily use the attribute “divine man” to express an exceptionally high degree of admiration
for a person—it is just as rare that a brute is found among men. It does happen, particu-
larly among barbarians, but in some cases disease and physical disability can make a
man brutish. “Brutishness” is also used as a term of opprobrium for those who exceed
all other men in vice.
But we must defer until later some mention of this kind of disposition, and vice
has already been discussed. We must now discuss moral weakness, softness, and effem-
inacy, also moral strength and tenacity. We will do so on the assumption that each of
these two sets of characteristics is neither identical with virtue or with wickedness nor
generically different from it, but different species respectively of the covering genera,
[namely, qualities to be sought and qualities to be avoided].
The proper procedure will be the one we have followed in our treatment of other
subjects: we must present phenomena, [that is, the observed facts of moral life and the
current beliefs about them,] and, after first stating the problems inherent in these, we must,
if possible, demonstrate the validity of all the beliefs about these matters,* and, if not, the
validity of most of them or of the most authoritative. For if the difficulties are resolved and
current beliefs are left intact, we shall have proved their validity sufficiently.
Now the current beliefs are as follows: (1) Moral strength and tenacity are quali-
ties of great moral value and deserve praise, while moral weakness and softness are
base and deserve blame. (2) A man who is morally strong tends to abide by the results
of his calculation, and a morally weak man tends to abandon them. (3) A morally weak
man does, on the basis of emotion, what he knows to be base, whereas a morally strong
man, knowing that certain appetites are base, refuses to follow them and accepts the
guidance of reason. (4) Though a self-controlled man is called morally strong and tena-
cious, some people affirm and others deny [the converse, namely,] that a morally strong
person is self-controlled in every respect; likewise, some people call a self-indulgent
person “morally weak” and a morally weak person “self-indulgent” without discrimi-
nating between the two, while others say that they are different. (5) Sometimes it is said
that a man of practical wisdom cannot possibly be morally weak, and sometimes people
who have practical wisdom and who are clever are said to be morally weak. (6) Finally,
it is said that moral weakness is shown even in anger and in the pursuit of honor and
profit. These, then, are the opinions commonly heard.
202530351145 b5101520*“Matters” here translates the Greek word pathos,which we usually render as “emotion” or “affect.”
Here, however, it is used in a loose and general sense to include the whole class of moral phenomena. In other
words, Aristotle does not mean to deny here that the qualities enumerated above are lasting characteristics.