206 ARISTOTLE
involved. Nor is he morally weak because of the mere fact of his relationship to these
situations, [namely, that he yields to temptation]. In that case moral weakness would
be the same as self-indulgence. Instead, his moral weakness is defined by the manner
[in which he yields]. For a self-indulgent person is led on by his own choice, since he
believes that he should always pursue the pleasure of the moment. A morally weak
man, on the other hand, does not think he should, but pursues it, nonetheless.
(1) The contention that it is true opinion rather than knowledge which a morally
weak man violates in his actions has no bearing on our argument. For some people have
no doubts when they hold an opinion, and think they have exact knowledge. Accordingly,
if we are going to say that the weakness of their belief is the reason why those who hold
opinion will be more liable to act against their conviction than those who have knowledge,
we shall find that there is no difference between knowledge and opinion. For some people
are no less firmly convinced of what they believe than others are of what they know:
Heraclitus is a case in point.* (a)But the verb “to know” has two meanings: a man is said
to “know” both when he does not use the knowledge he has and when he does use it.
Accordingly, when a man does wrong it will make a difference whether he is not exercis-
ing the knowledge he has, [viz., that it is wrong to do what he is doing,] or whether he is
exercising it. In the latter case, we would be baffled, but not if he acted without exercising
his knowledge.
Moreover,(b)since there are two kinds of premise,** [namely, universal and
particular,] it may well happen that a man knows both [major and minor premise of a
practical syllogism] and yet acts against his knowledge, because the [minor] premise
which he uses is universal rather than particular. [In that case, he cannot apply his
knowledge to his action,] for the actions to be performed are particulars. Also, there are
two kinds of universal term to be distinguished: one applies to (i)the agent, and the
other (ii)to the thing. For example, when a person knows that dry food is good for all
men, [he may also know] (i)that he is a man, or (ii)that this kind of food is dry. But
whether the particular food before him is of this kind is something of which a morally
weak man either does not have the knowledge or does not exercise it. So we see that
there will be a tremendous difference between these two ways of knowing. We do not
regard it as at all strange that a morally weak person “knows” in the latter sense [with
one term nonspecific], but it would be surprising if he “knew” in the other sense,
[namely with both terms apprehended as concrete particulars].
There is (c)another way besides those we have so far described, in which it is
possible for men to have knowledge. When a person has knowledge but does not use it,
we see that “having” a characteristic has different meanings. There is a sense in which a
person both has and does not have knowledge, for example, when he is asleep, mad, or2530351147 a
5*The reference is not to any specific utterance of Heraclitus, but to the tone of intense conviction with
which he asserted all his doctrines, some of which Aristotle finds patently false, and hence examples of opin-
ion rather than knowledge.
**What is involved in this paragraph is the practical syllogism. However, a refinement is added here,
which requires further explanation. A major premise, Aristotle says, may contain two kinds of universal,
e.g., the premise that “dry food is good for all men” makes a universal statement about (i) men and (ii) about
dry food. Accordingly, two kinds of syllogism can be developed from this major premise. The first: “dry food
is good for all men”; “I am a man”; therefore, “dry food is good for me” is here neglected by Aristotle,
because the agent is obviously always aware of being a person. But the second possible syllogism: “dry food
is good for all men”; “this kind of food is dry”; therefore, “this kind of food is good for me,” leaves the agent
only with the general knowledge that, for example, cereals are good, but the individual will not yet know
whether this barley is a cereal. “Knowledge” of this sort will obviously not serve to check a healthy appetite
faced with an attractive bowl of porridge.10