NICOMACHEANETHICS(BOOKVII) 209
and pains but not in the same way. Self-indulgent men pursue the excess by choice, but
the morally weak do not exercise choice.
That is why we are probably more justified in calling a person self-indulgent who
shows little or no appetite in pursuing an excess of pleasures and in avoiding moderate
pains, than a person who is driven by strong appetite [to pursue pleasure and to avoid
pain]. For what would the former do, if, in addition, he had the vigorous appetite of
youth and felt strong pain at lacking the objects necessary for his pleasure?
Some appetites and desires are generically noble and worth while—[let us remember]
our earlier distinction of pleasant things into those which are by nature desirable, the oppo-
site of these, and those which are intermediate between the two—for example, material
goods, profit, victory, and honor. Now, people are not blamed for being affected by all these
and similar objects of pleasure and by those of the intermediate kind, nor are they blamed
for having an appetite or a liking for them; they are blamed only for the manner in which
they do so, if they do so to excess. This, by the way, is why [we do not regard as wicked] all
those who, contrary to right reason, are overpowered by something that is noble and good by
nature, or who pursue it—those, for example, who devote themselves to the pursuit of honor
or to their children and parents more than they should. All these things are good, and those
who devote themselves to them are praised. And yet even here there is an element of excess,
if, like Niobe, one were to fight against the gods [for the sake of one’s children], or if one
showed the same excessively foolish devotion to his father as did Satyros, nicknamed “the
filial.”* So we see that there cannot be any wickedness in this area, because, as we stated,
each of these things is in itself naturally desirable. But excess in one’s attachment to them is
base and must be avoided.
Similarly, there cannot be moral weakness in this area [of things naturally desirable].
Moral weakness is not only something to be avoided, but it is also something that deserves
blame. Still, because there is a similarity in the affect, people do call it “moral weakness,”
but they add “in regard to [such-and-such],” in the same way as they speak of a “bad” doc-
tor or a “bad” actor without meaning to imply that the person is bad in the unqualified
sense. So just as in the case of the doctor and the actor [we do not speak of “badness” in
the unqualified sense], because their badness is not vice but only something similar to vice
by analogy, so it is clear that, in the other case, we must understand by “moral weakness”
and “moral strength” only that which operates in the same sphere as self-control and self-
indulgence. When we use these terms of anger, we do so only in an analogous sense.
Therefore, we add a qualification and say “morally weak in regard to anger,” just as we say
“morally weak in regard to honor or profit.”
- Moral Weakness and Brutishness:(1) Some things are pleasant by nature,
partly (a)without qualification, and partly (b)pleasant for different classes of animals
and humans. Then (2) there are things which are not pleasant by nature, but which come
to be pleasant (a) through physical disability,(b)through habit, or (c)through an
[innate] depravity of nature. We can observe characteristics corresponding to each of
the latter group (2), just as [we did in discussing (1), things pleasant by nature]. I mean
(2c) characteristics of brutishness, for instance, the female who is said to rip open preg-
nant women and devour the infants; or what is related about some of the savage tribes
2025301148 b510*Niobe boasted that, with her six (or in some versions, seven) sons and an equal number of daughters,
she was at least equal to the goddess Leto, who only had two children, the twins Apollo and Artemis. Apollo
and Artemis thereupon killed all her children, and Niobe was turned into stone. Who exactly Satyros was, we
do not know. Ancient commentators tell us that he committed suicide when his father died, or that he called
his father a god.
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