212 ARISTOTLE
house by his son asked him to stop at the door, on the grounds that he himself had not
dragged his father any further than that.
Moreover, (3) the more underhanded a person is, the more unjust he is. Now, a hot-
tempered man is not underhanded; nor is anger: it is open. But appetite has the same
attribute as Aphrodite, who is called “weaver of guile on Cyprus born,” and as her
“pattern-pierced zone,” of which Homer says: “endearment that steals the heart away even
from the thoughtful.” Therefore, since moral weakness of this type [which involves the
appetite] is more unjust and baser than moral weakness concerning anger, it is this type
which constitutes moral weakness in the unqualified sense and is even a kind of vice.*
Again, (4) no one feels pain when insulting another without provocation, whereas
everyone who acts in a fit of anger acts with pain. On the contrary, whoever unprovoked
insults another, feels pleasure. If, then, acts which justify outbursts of anger are more
unjust than others, it follows that moral weakness caused by appetite [is more unjust
than moral weakness caused by anger], for anger does not involve unprovoked insult.
It is now clear that moral weakness in regard to the appetites is more disgraceful
than moral weakness displayed in anger, and also that moral strength and weakness
operate in the sphere of the bodily appetites and pleasures. But we must still grasp
the distinctions to be made within bodily appetites and pleasures. For, as we stated at
the beginning, some pleasures are human, i.e., natural in kind as well as in degree, while
others are brutish, and others again are due to physical disability and disease. It is
only with the first group of these, [i.e., the human pleasures,] that self-control and self-
indulgence are concerned. For that reason, we do not call beasts either self-controlled or
self-indulgent; if we do so, we do it only metaphorically, in cases where a general
distinction can be drawn between one class of animals and another on the basis of wan-
tonness, destructiveness, and indiscriminate voracity. [This use is only metaphorical]
because beasts are incapable of choice and calculation, but [animals of this type] stand
outside the pale of their nature, just as madmen do among humans.
Brutishness is a lesser evil than vice, but it is more horrifying. For [in a beast] the
better element cannot be perverted, as it can be in man, since it is lacking. [To compare
a brute beast and a brutish man] is like comparing an inanimate with an animate being
to see which is more evil. For the depravity of a being which does not possess the source
that initiates its own motion is always less destructive [than the depravity of a being that
possesses this source], and intelligence is such a source. A similar comparison can be
made between injustice [as such] and an unjust man: each is in some sense worse than
the other, for a bad man can do ten thousand times as much harm as a beast.- Moral Strength and Moral Weakness: Tenacity and Softness:As regards the
pleasures, pains, appetites, and aversions that come to us through touch and taste, and
which we defined earlier as the sphere of self-indulgence and self-control, it is possible
to be the kind of person who is overcome even by those which most people master; but
it is also possible to master those by which most people are overcome. Those who are
overcome by pleasure or master it are, respectively, morally weak and morally strong;
and in the case of pain, they are, respectively, soft and tenacious. The disposition which
characterizes the majority of men lies between these two, although they tend more to
the inferior characteristics.
Some pleasures are necessary, up to a certain point, and others are not, whereas
neither excesses nor deficiencies of pleasure are necessary. The same is also true of
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5*But it is not vice in the unqualified sense, for that would involve choice.1015