Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

(Marvins-Underground-K-12) #1

NICOMACHEANETHICS(BOOKVII) 217


are morally weak by nature. For it is easier to change habit than to change nature. Even
habit is hard to change, precisely because it resembles nature, as Euenus says:


A habit, friend, is of long practice born,
and practice ends in fashioning man’s nature.*

We have now completed our definitions of moral strength, moral weakness,
tenacity, and softness, and stated how these characteristics are related to one another.



  1. Pleasure: Some Current Views:It is the role of a political philosopher to study
    pleasure and pain. For he is the supreme craftsman of the end to which we look when
    we call one particular thing bad and another good in the unqualified sense. Moreover,
    an examination of this subject is one of the tasks we must logically undertake, since we
    established that virtue and vice of character are concerned with pains and pleasures, and
    most people claim that happiness involves pleasure. That is why the word “blessed” is
    derived from the word “enjoy.”
    Now, (1) some people believe that no pleasure is good, either in itself or incidentally,
    since the good and pleasure are not the same thing.** (2) Others hold that, though some
    pleasures are good, most of them are bad.*** (3) Then there is a third view, according to
    which it is impossible for pleasure to be the highest good, even if all pleasures are good.†
    [The following arguments are advanced to support (1) the contention that] pleasure
    is not a good at all:(a)All pleasure is a process or coming-to-be leading to the natural
    state [of the subject] and perceived [by the subject]; but no process is of the same order as
    its ends, e.g., the building process is not of the same order as a house. Further,(b)a self-
    controlled man avoids pleasures. Again,(c)a man of practical wisdom does not pursue the
    pleasant, but what is free from pain.††Moreover,(d )pleasures are an obstacle to good
    sense: the greater the joy one feels, e.g., in sexual intercourse, the greater the obstacle;
    for no one is capable of rational insight while enjoying sexual relations.†††Also,(e)there
    is no art of pleasure; yet every good is the result of an art. Finally,(f)children and beasts
    pursue pleasures, whereas they do not know what is good.
    [The arguments for the view (2) that] not all pleasures are good are:(a)Some
    pleasures are disgraceful and cause for reproach; and (b)some pleasures are harmful,
    for there are pleasant things that may cause disease.
    [And the argument in favor of (3), the contention that] pleasure is not the highest
    good, is that it is not an end but a process or coming-to-be. These are roughly the views
    put forward.

  2. The Views Discussed: (1) Is Pleasure a Good Thing?:But the following consid-
    erations will show that the arguments we have enumerated do not lead us to the conclusion


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Euenus of Paros was a famous Sophist, who lived in the late fifth century B.C.
This view seems to have been propounded by Speusippus, Plato’s nephew and disciple, who
succeeded him as head of the Academy from 347–339 B.C. A similar view had been espoused by Antisthenes
(ca. 455–ca. 360 B.C.), the friend of Socrates and precursor of the Cynic School.
This is probably a reference to the view stated by Plato in Philebus13b.
†No particular proponents of this view can be identified, but they are also discussed in Plato’s Philebus
53c–55c.
††Arguments (b) and (c) had probably been used by Speusippus and before him perhaps by
Antisthenes.
†††This argument may come from Archytas, a Pythagorean philosopher, mathematician, ruler of
Tarentum, and friend of Plato, in the first half of the fourth century B.C.


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