NICOMACHEANETHICS(BOOKVII) 219
Nevertheless, the arts of perfume-making as well as of cooking are generally regarded
as arts of pleasure.
The arguments (1b) that a self-controlled person avoids pleasure, (1c) that a man of
practical wisdom pursues a life free from pain, and (1f) that children and beasts pursue
pleasure, are all refuted by the same consideration. We have stated in what sense pleasures
are good without qualification and in what sense not all pleasures are good. These last
mentioned are the pleasures which beasts and children pursue, while a man of practical
wisdom wants to be free from the pain which they imply. They are the pleasures that
involve appetite and pain, i.e., the bodily pleasures—for they are of this sort—and their
excesses, in terms of which a self-indulgent man is self-indulgent. That is why a self-
controlled man avoids these pleasures. But there are pleasures even for the self-controlled.
- The Views Discussed: (3) Is Pleasure the Highest Good?:To continue: there is
general agreement that pain is bad and must be avoided. One kind of pain is bad in the
unqualified sense, and another kind is bad, because in some way or other it obstructs us.
Now, the opposite of a thing to be avoided—in the sense that it must be avoided and is
bad—is good. It follows, therefore, necessarily that pleasure is a good. Speusippus tried to
solve the question by saying that, just as the greater is opposed both to the less and to the
equal, [so pleasure is opposed both to pain and to the good]. But this solution does not
come out correctly: surely, he would not say that pleasure is essentially a species of evil.
But (2a) even if some pleasures are bad, it does not mean that the highest good
cannot be some sort of pleasure, just as the highest good may be some sort of knowl-
edge, even though some kinds of knowledge are bad. Perhaps we must even draw the
necessary conclusion that it is; for since each characteristic has its unobstructed activ-
ities, the activity of all characteristics or of one of them—depending on whether the
former or the latter constitutes happiness—if unobstructed, must be the most desirable
of all. And this activity is pleasure. Therefore, the highest good is some sort of plea-
sure, despite the fact that most pleasures are bad and, if you like, bad in the unqualified
sense of the word. It is for this reason that everyone thinks that the happy life is a
pleasant life, and links pleasure with happiness. And it makes good sense this way: for
no activity is complete and perfect as long as it is obstructed, and happiness is a com-
plete and perfect thing. This is why a happy man also needs the goods of the body,
external goods, and the goods of fortune, in order not to be obstructed by their absence.
But those who assert* that a man is happy even on the rack and even when great
misfortunes befall him, provided that he is good, are talking nonsense, whether they
know it or not. Since happiness also needs fortune, some people regard good fortune as
identical with happiness. But that is not true, for even good fortune, if excessive, can be
an obstruction; perhaps we are, in that case, no longer justified in calling it “good
fortune,” for its definition is determined by its relation to happiness.
Also, the fact that all beasts and all men pursue pleasure is some indication that it
is, in a sense, the highest good:
There is no talk that ever quite dies down,
if spread by many men....But since no single nature and no single characteristic condition is, or is regarded, as the
best [for all], people do not all pursue the same pleasure, yet all pursue pleasure. Perhaps
30351153 b51015*The Cynics are probably meant.202530