NICOMACHEANETHICS(BOOKX) 221
give them joy, and because of their nature, it is painful for them to feel neither [pleasure
nor pain]. Actually, animal nature is under a constant strain, as the students of natural
science attest when they say that seeing and hearing are painful, but [we do not feel
the pain because,] as they assert, we have become accustomed to it. Similarly, whereas
the growing process [we go through] in our youth puts us into the same [exhilarated]
state as that of a drunken man, and [makes] youth the age of pleasure, excitable natures,
on the other hand, always need remedial action: as a result of [the excess of black bile
in their] constitutional blend, their bodies are exposed to constant gnawing sensations,
and they are always in a state of vehement desire. Now, since pain is driven out by the
pleasure opposed to it or by any strong pleasure at all, excitable people become self-
indulgent and bad.
Pleasures unattended by pain do not admit of excess. The objects of these plea-
sures are what is pleasant by nature and not what is incidentally pleasant. By “things
incidentally pleasant” I mean those that act as remedies. For since it is through some
action of that part of us which has remained sound that a cure is effected, the remedy is
regarded as being pleasant. But [pleasant by nature it is not]: pleasant by nature are
those things which produce the action of an unimpaired natural state.
There is no single object that continues to be pleasant forever, because our nature
is not simple but contains another natural element, which makes us subject to decay.
Consequently, whenever one element does something, it runs counter to the nature of the
other; and whenever the two elements are in a state of equilibrium, the act performed
seems neither painful nor pleasant. If there is a being with a simple nature, the same
action will always be the most pleasant to him. That is why the divinity always enjoys
one single and simple pleasure: for there is not only an activity of motion but also an
activity of immobility, and pleasure consists in rest rather than in motion. But “change in
all things is pleasant,” as the poet has it, because of some evil in us. For just as a man who
changes easily is bad, so also is a nature that needs to change. The reason is that such a
nature is not simple and not [entirely] good.
This completes our discussion of moral strength and moral weakness, and of plea-
sure and pain. We have stated what each of them is and in what sense some of them are
good and some bad. It now remains to talk about friendship.
BOOKX
- Happiness and Activity:Now that we have completed our discussion of the
virtues, and of the different kinds of friendship and pleasure, it remains to sketch an
outline of happiness, since, as we assert, it is the end or goal of human [aspirations].
Our account will be more concise if we recapitulate what we have said so far.
We stated, then, that happiness is not a characteristic; if it were, a person who
passes his whole life in sleep, vegetating like a plant, or someone who experiences the
greatest misfortunes could possess it. If, then, such a conclusion is unacceptable, we
must, in accordance with our earlier discussion, classify happiness as some sort of activ-
ity. Now, some activities are necessary and desirable only for the sake of something else,
while others are desirable in themselves. Obviously, happiness must be classed as an
activity desirable in itself and not for the sake of something else. For happiness lacks
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