222 ARISTOTLE
nothing and is self-sufficient. Activities desirable in themselves are those from which we
seek to derive nothing beyond the actual exercise of the activity. Actions in conformity
with virtue evidently constitute such activities; for to perform noble and good deeds is
something desirable for its own sake.
Pleasant amusements, too, [are desirable for their own sake]. We do not choose
them for the sake of something else, since they lead to harm rather than good when we
become neglectful of our bodies and our property. But most of those who are considered
happy find an escape in pastimes of this sort, and this is why people who are well versed
in such pastimes find favor at the courts of tyrants; they make themselves pleasant by
providing what the tyrants are after, and what they want is amusement. Accordingly,
such amusements are regarded as being conducive to happiness, because men who are
in positions of power devote their leisure to them. But perhaps such persons cannot be
[regarded as] evidence. For virtue and intelligence, which are the sources of morally
good activities, do not consist in wielding power. Also, if these men, who have never
tasted pure and generous pleasure, find an escape in the pleasures of the body, this is
no sufficient reason for thinking that such pleasures are in fact more desirable. For
children, too, think that what they value is actually the best. It is, therefore, not surpris-
ing that as children apparently do not attach value to the same things as do adults, so
bad men do not attach value to the same things as do good men. Accordingly, as we
have stated repeatedly, what is valuable and pleasant to a morally good man actually is
valuable and pleasant. Each individual considers that activity most desirable which
corresponds to his own proper characteristic condition, and a morally good man, of
course, so considers activity in conformity with virtue.
Consequently, happiness does not consist in amusement. In fact, it would be strange
if our end were amusement, and if we were to labor and suffer hardships all our life long
merely to amuse ourselves. For, one might say, we choose everything for the sake of
something else—except happiness; for happiness is an end. Obviously, it is foolish and all
too childish to exert serious efforts and toil for purposes of amusement. Anacharsis*
seems to be right when he advises to play in order to be serious; for amusement is a form
of rest, and since we cannot work continuously we need rest. Thus rest is not an end, for
we take it for the sake of [further] activity. The happy life is regarded as a life in confor-
mity with virtue. It is a life which involves effort and is not spent in amusement.
Moreover, we say that what is morally good is better than what is ridiculous and
brings amusement, and the better the organ or man—whichever may be involved in a
particular case—the greater the moral value of the activity. But the activity of the better
organ or the better man is in itself superior and more conducive to happiness.
Furthermore, any person at all, even a slave, can enjoy bodily pleasures no less
than the best of men. But no one would grant that a slave has a share in happiness any
more than that he lives a life of his own. For happiness does not consist in pastimes of
this sort, but in activities that conform with virtue, as we have stated earlier.- Happiness, Intelligence, and the Contemplative Life:Now, if happiness is
activity in conformity with virtue, it is to be expected that it should conform with the
highest virtue, and that is the virtue of the best part of us. Whether this is intelligence or
something else which, it is thought, by its very nature rules and guides us and which
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510*Anacharsis, who is said to have lived early in the sixth century B.C., was a Scythian whose travels
all over the Greek world brought him a reputation for wisdom. He allegedly met Solon at Athens and was
numbered in some ancient traditions among the Seven Wise Men.