Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

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NICOMACHEANETHICS(BOOKX) 223


gives us our notions of what is noble and divine; whether it is itself divine or the most
divine thing in us; it is the activity of this part [when operating] in conformity with the
excellence or virtue proper to it that will be complete happiness. That it is an activity
concerned with theoretical knowledge or contemplation has already been stated.
This would seem to be consistent with our earlier statements as well as the truth.
For this activity is not only the highest—for intelligence is the highest possession we
have in us, and the objects which are the concern of intelligence are the highest objects of
knowledge—but also the most continuous: we are able to study continuously more easily
than to perform any kind of action. Furthermore, we think of pleasure as a necessary ingre-
dient in happiness. Now everyone agrees that of all the activities that conform with virtue
activity in conformity with theoretical wisdom is the most pleasant. At any rate, it seems
that [the pursuit of wisdom or] philosophy holds pleasures marvelous in purity and cer-
tainty, and it is not surprising that time spent in knowledge is more pleasant than time spent
in research. Moreover, what is usually called “selfsufficiency” will be found in the highest
degree in the activity which is concerned with theoretical knowledge. Like a just man and
any other virtuous man, a wise man requires the necessities of life; once these have been
adequately provided, a just man still needs people toward whom and in company with
whom to act justly, and the same is true of a self-controlled man, a courageous man, and all
the rest. But a wise man is able to study even by himself, and the wiser he is the more is he
able to do it. Perhaps he could do it better if he had colleagues to work with him, but he still
is the most self-sufficient of all. Again, study seems to be the only activity which is loved
for its own sake. For while we derive a greater or a smaller advantage from practical pur-
suits beyond the action itself, from study we derive nothing beyond the activity of studying.
Also, we regard happiness as depending on leisure; for our purpose in being busy is to have
leisure, and we wage war in order to have peace. Now, the practical virtues are activated in
political and military pursuits, but the actions involved in these pursuits seem to be
unleisurely. This is completely true of military pursuits, since no one chooses to wage war
or foments war for the sake of war; he would have to be utterly bloodthirsty if he were to
make enemies of his friends simply in order to have battle and slaughter. But the activity of
the statesman, too, has no leisure. It attempts to gain advantages beyond political action,
advantages such as political power, prestige, or at least happiness for the statesman himself
and his fellow citizens, and that is something other than political activity: after all, the very
fact that we investigate politics shows that it is not the same [as happiness]. Therefore, if we
take as established (1) that political and military actions surpass all other actions that con-
form with virtue in nobility and grandeur; (2) that they are unleisurely, aim at an end, and
are not chosen for their own sake; (3) that the activity of our intelligence, inasmuch as it is
an activity concerned with theoretical knowledge, is thought to be of greater value than the
others, aims at no end beyond itself, and has a pleasure proper to itself—and pleasure
increases activity; and (4) that the qualities of this activity evidently are self-sufficiency,
leisure, as much freedom from fatigue as a human being can have, and whatever else falls
to the lot of a supremely happy man; it follows that the activity of our intelligence consti-
tutes the complete happiness of man, provided that it encompasses a complete span of life;
for nothing connected with happiness must be incomplete.
However, such a life would be more than human. A man who would live it would
do so not insofar as he is human, but because there is a divine element within him. This
divine element is as far above our composite nature* as its activity is above the active


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*Human beings, consisting of soul and body, i.e., of form and matter, are composite beings, whereas
the divine, being all intelligence, is not.

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