GAUNILO ANDANSELM: DEBATE 313
GAUNILO:[7.] As for the statement that it is inconceivable that the highest thing of all
should not exist, it might be better to say its nonexistence or even its possibility of
nonexistence is unintelligible. For according to the true meaning of the word, unreal
things are not intelligible, but their existence is conceivable in the way that the fool
thinks that God does not exist. I most certainly know I exist, but for all that, I know my
nonexistence is possible. As for that supreme being which God is, I understand without
doubt both his existence and the impossibility of his nonexistence. But whether I can
conceive of my nonexistence as long as I most certainly know I exist, I don’t know. But
if I am able to, why can I not conceive of the nonexistence of whatever else I know with
the same certainty? But if I cannot, then such an inability will not be something peculiar
to God [i.e., being such that He cannot be thought not to exist.]
ANSELM:[IV.] You claim moreover that when we say this supreme reality cannot be
conceived of as nonexistent, it would be perhaps better to say that its nonexistence or
even the possibility of its nonexistence is not understandable. But it is better to say it can-
not be conceived. For had I said that the reality itself could not be understood not to exist,
perhaps you, who insist that according to proper usage what is false cannot be under-
stood, would object that nothing existing could be understood not to exist. For it is false
to claim that what exists does not exist. Hence it would not be peculiar to God to be
unable to be understood as nonexistent. If any one of the things that most certainly exist
can be understood to be nonexistent, however, then other certain things can also be
understood to be nonexistent. But this objection cannot be applied to “conceiving,” if this
is correctly understood. For though none of the things that exist can be understood not to
exist, still they can all be conceived as nonexistent, except the greatest. For all—and
only—those things can be conceived as nonexistent which have a beginning or end or
consist of parts or do not exist in their entirety in any time or place, as I have said. Only
that being which cannot be conceived to be nonexistent must be conceived as having no
beginning or end or composition of parts but is whole and entire always and everywhere.
Consequently you must realize that you can conceive of yourself as nonexistent,
though you most certainly know that you exist. You surprise me when you say you are
not sure of this. For we conceive of many things as nonexistent which we know to exist
and of many things as existent which we know do not exist. And we conceive them thus
not by judging but by imagining them so. We can indeed conceive of something as exis-
tent even while we know it does not exist, because we are able to conceive the one at the
same time that we know the other. But we cannot conceive nonexistence while knowing
existence, because we cannot conceive existence and nonexistence at the same time. If
anyone distinguishes between the two senses of the statement in this fashion, then, he
will understand that nothing, as long as it is known to be, can be conceived not to be,
and that whatever exists, with the exception of a thing such that no greater is conceiv-
able, can be conceived of as nonexistent even when it is known to exist. This inability to
be conceived of as nonexistent, then, is peculiar to God, even though there are many
objects which cannot be conceived not to be while they are. As for the way in which
God can still be said to be conceived as not existing, I believe this has been explained
clearly enough in my little book itself.