Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

they are able to will contrary to what they feel. Now one can easily dispel these misconcep-
tions if one attends to the nature of thought, which is quite removed from the concept of
extension. Then one will clearly understand that an idea, being a mode of thinking, consists
neither in the image of a thing nor in words. For the essence of words and images is consti-
tuted solely by corporeal motions far removed from the concept of thought. With these few
words of warning, I turn to the aforementioned objections.
The first of these rests on the confident claim that the will extends more widely
than the intellect, and therefore is different from it. The reason for their belief that the
will extends more widely than the intellect is that they find—so they say—that they do
not need a greater faculty of assent, that is, of affirming and denying, than they already
possess, in order to assent to an infinite number of other things that we do not perceive,
but that we do need an increased faculty of understanding. Therefore, will is distinct
from intellect, the latter being finite and the former infinite.
Second, it may be objected against us that experience appears to tell us most indis-
putably that we are able to suspend judgment so as not to assent to things that we
perceive, and this is also confirmed by the fact that nobody is said to be deceived insofar
as he perceives something, but only insofar as he assents or dissents. For instance, he
who imagines a winged horse does not thereby grant that there is a winged horse; that is,
he is not thereby deceived unless at the same time he grants that there is a winged horse.
So experience appears to tell us most indisputably that the will, that is, the faculty of
assenting, is free, and different from the faculty of understanding.
Third, it may be objected that one affirmation does not seem to contain more
reality than another; that is, we do not seem to need greater power in order to affirm
that what is true is true than to affirm that what is false is true. On the other hand, we
do perceive that one idea has more reality or perfection than another. For some ideas
are more perfect than others in proportion as some objects are superior to others. This,
again, is a clear indication that there is a difference between will and intellect.
Fourth, it may be objected that if man does not act from freedom of will, what
would happen if he should be in a state of equilibrium like Buridan’s ass? Will he perish
of hunger and thirst? If I were to grant this, I would appear to be thinking of an ass or a
statue, not of a man. If I deny it, then the man will be determining himself, and conse-
quently will possess the faculty of going and doing whatever he wants.
Besides these objections there may possibly be others. But since I am not obliged
to quash every objection that can be dreamed up, I shall make it my task to reply to
these objections only, and as briefly as possible.
To the first objection I reply that, if by the intellect is meant clear and distinct ideas
only, I grant that the will extends more widely than the intellect, but I deny that the will
extends more widely than perceptions, that is, the faculty of conceiving. Nor indeed do I
see why the faculty of willing should be termed infinite any more than the faculty of
sensing. For just as by the same faculty of willing we can affirm an infinite number of
things (but in succession, for we cannot affirm an infinite number of things simultane-
ously), so also we can sense or perceive an infinite number of bodies (in succession) by
the same faculty of sensing. If my objectors should say that there are an infinite number
of things that we cannot sense, I retort that we cannot grasp them by any amount of
thought, and consequently by any amount of willing. But, they say, if God wanted to
bring it about that we should perceive these too, he would have had to give us a greater
faculty of perceiving, but not a greater faculty of willing than he has already given us.
This is the same as saying that if God wishes to bring it about that we should understand
an infinite number of other entities, he would have to give us a greater intellect than he

520 BARUCHSPINOZA