Philosophic Classics From Plato to Derrida

already has, so as to encompass these same infinite entities, but not a more universal idea
of entity. For we have shown that the will is a universal entity, or the idea whereby we
explicate all particular volitions; that is, that which is common to all particular volitions.
So if they believe that this common or universal idea of volitions is a faculty, it is not at
all surprising that they declare this faculty to extend beyond the limits of the intellect to
infinity. For the term “universal” is applied equally to one, to many, and to an infinite
number of individuals.
To the second objection I reply by denying that we have free power to suspend
judgment. For when we say that someone suspends judgment, we are saying only that
he sees that he is not adequately perceiving the thing. So suspension of judgment is
really a perception, not free will. To understand this more clearly, let us conceive a boy
imagining a winged horse and having no other perception. Since this imagining
involves the existence of a horse (Cor. Pr. 17, II), and the boy perceives nothing to annul
the existence of the horse, he will regard the horse as present and he will not be able to
doubt its existence, although he is not certain of it. We experience this quite commonly
in dreams, nor do I believe there is anyone who thinks that while dreaming he has free
power to suspend judgment regarding the contents of his dream, and of bringing it about
that he should not dream what he dreams that he sees. Nevertheless, it does happen that
even in dreams we suspend judgment, to wit, when we dream that we are dreaming.
Furthermore, I grant that nobody is deceived insofar as he has a perception; that is,
I grant that the imaginings of the mind, considered in themselves, involve no error
(see Sch. Pr. 17, II). But I deny that a man makes no affirmation insofar as he has a per-
ception. For what else is perceiving a winged horse than affirming wings of a horse? For
if the mind should perceive nothing apart from the winged horse, it would regard the
horse as present to it, and would have no cause to doubt its existence nor any faculty of
dissenting, unless the imagining of the winged horse were to be connected to an idea
which annuls the existence of the said horse, or he perceives that the idea which he has
of the winged horse is inadequate. Then he will either necessarily deny the existence of
the horse or he will necessarily doubt it.
In the above I think I have also answered the third objection by my assertion
that the will is a universal term predicated of all ideas and signifying only what is
common to all ideas, namely, affirmation, the adequate essence of which, insofar as it
is thus conceived as an abstract term, must be in every single idea, and the same in all
in this respect only. But not insofar as it is considered as constituting the essence of
the idea, for in that respect particular affirmations differ among themselves as much
as do ideas. For example, the affirmation which the idea of a circle involves differs
from the affirmation which the idea of a triangle involves as much as the idea of a
circle differs from the idea of a triangle. Again, I absolutely deny that we need an
equal power of thinking to affirm that what is true is true as to affirm that what is false
is true. For these two affirmations, if you look to their meaning and not to the words
alone, are related to one another as being to nonbeing. For there is nothing in ideas
that constitutes the form of falsity (see Pr. 35, II with Sch. and Sch. Pr. 47, II).
Therefore, it is important to note here how easily we are deceived when we confuse
universals with particulars, and mental constructs [entia rationis] and abstract terms
with the real.
As to the fourth objection, I readily grant that a man placed in such a state of equi-
librium (namely, where he feels nothing else but hunger and thirst and perceives nothing
but such-and-such food and drink at equal distances from him) will die of hunger and
thirst. If they ask me whether such a man is not to be reckoned an ass rather than a man,

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