582 GOTTFRIEDLEIBNIZ
Gottfried Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics and Related Writings, edited and translated with an introduction,
[Leibniz made minor additions, deletions, and/or changes to virtually every paragraph of this work. I have
chosen to reproduce Leibniz’s text minus all material deleted by Leibniz.]
DISCOURSE ON METAPHYSICS
- ON THEDIVINEPERFECTION: GODDOESEVERYTHING
IN THEMOSTDESIRABLEWAY
The most commonly accepted notion of God we have, and the one most full of mean-
ing, is well enough expressed in these terms: God is an absolutely perfect being. Not
enough thought, however, is given to its consequences. If we are to make progress, it is
relevant to note that in nature there are several entirely different perfections, that God
possesses them all together, and that each belongs to Him to the highest degree.
We also need to understand what a perfection is. A sure enough mark of one is
that forms or natures not admitting of an ultimate degree are not perfections, as for
example the nature of numbers or of shape. For the greatest of all numbers (or rather
the number of all numbers), and the greatest of all shapes imply contradictions while
omniscience and omnipotence involve no impossibility. Consequently, power and
knowledge are perfections, and to the extent that they belong to God, they have no
limits.
Hence it follows that since God possesses supreme and infinite wisdom, He acts
in the most perfect manner, not only in the metaphysical sense, but also morally speak-
ing. From our point of view we can express ourselves thus: the more we are enlightened
and informed about the works of God, the more we shall be disposed to find that they
are excellent and satisfactory in every way we could hope.
- AGAINSTTHOSEWHOMAINTAIN THATTHEREISNOGOODNESS
IN THEWORKS OFGOD, OR THAT THERULES OFGOODNESS
ANDBEAUTYAREARBITRARY
Thus I am far removed from the opinion of those who maintain that there are no rules
of goodness or perfection in the nature of things or in the ideas God has of them, and
that the works of God are good only for the formal reason that God made them. For if
that were so, since God knew He was their author, He had only to look at them after
making them to find them good, in accordance with the testimony of Holy Scripture.
But Scripture seems to have made use of this anthropomorphic way of speaking only to
make us realise that we recognise the excellence of God’s works by considering them
by themselves, even when we disregard the purely extrinsic denomination that refers
them to their cause. This is all the more true in that it is by considering the works that
we can discover the Worker, so that the works must carry His marks in themselves. I
confess that the contrary opinion seems to me extremely dangerous, and very close to
notes and glossary by R. Niall D. Martin and Stuart Brown, Manchester University Press, 1988. [The translation
used comes from our edition in which we attempted to help scholars understand the document and the thinking
behind it by including additions and deletions to highlight Leibniz s evolving thought, and to show other relevant
documents from the same period for a like purpose. We would encourage users of this edition particulary interested
in Leibniz to consult our edition and its scholarly apparatus.]
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