DISCOURSE ONMETAPHYSICS 583
the way the Spinozists think of goodness and harmony. Their opinion is that the beauty
of the universe and the goodness we attribute to the works of God are no more than the
chimeras of men who conceive God according to their own way of thinking. Also, if we
say that things are good by no rule of goodness beyond the will of God alone, we
thoughtlessly destroy, I feel, all the love and glory of God. For why praise Him for what
He had done if He would be equally praiseworthy for doing the opposite? Where will
His justice and His wisdom be, if all that remains of Him is some kind of a despotic
power, if His will takes the place of reason, and if, by the very definition of tyranny,
what pleases the Almighty is ipso factojust? Besides, it seems that every act of willing
presupposes some reason for willing, and that reason is naturally prior to will. That is
why I still find altogether strange the expression of Descartes who says that even the
eternal truths of metaphysics and geometry, and consequently also the rules of good-
ness, justice and perfection are no more than the effects of God’s will. It seems to me,
rather, that they are no more than the consequences of His understanding, which cer-
tainly does not depend on His will, any more His essence does.
- AGAINSTTHOSEWHOTHINKGODCOULD
HAV EDONEBETTER
Neither can I approve the opinion of some scholastics who maintain boldly that what
God has done is not absolutely perfect, and that He could have done much better. For it
seems to me that the consequences of this opinion are altogether contrary to the glory of
God. “Just as the lesser evil contains a proportion of good, so the lesser good contains a
proportion of evil.” To act with less perfection than one could have done is to act imper-
fectly. To show that an architect could have done better is to find fault with his work. It
also runs counter to the assurance of the goodness of God’s works in Holy Scripture. For,
since perfections decrease to infinity, however God did his work, it would always be
good in comparison with the less perfect, if that were enough. But a thing is not very
praiseworthy if it is only so in that way. I also think that a very large number of passages
favouring my opinion could be found in the divine Scriptures and the holy Fathers, with
scarcely any favouring that of those new scholastics a view unknown, in my opinion, to
the whole of antiquity. It is based on our insufficient knowledge of the general harmony
of the universe and of the hidden reasons for God’s conduct which lead us to the rash
judgement that many things could have been done better. Besides, these moderns insist
on some subtleties that are not very sound, for they imagine that nothing is so perfect but
that there is something that is more perfect, which is a mistake. There is an infinity of
regular figures, but one is the most perfect, namely the circle. If a triangle had to be made
and there was no further specification of the kind of triangle, God would assuredly make
an equilateral triangle because, absolutely speaking, that is the most perfect.
They also think that in this way they are providing for the liberty of God, as if
it were not the highest liberty to act in accordance with sovereign reason. For, apart
from its apparent impossibility, the belief that God acts in some matter without any
reason for His act of will is hardly consistent with His glory. Suppose, for example,
that God chooses between A and B, and that He takes A without any reason for pre-
ferring it to B; I say that that action of God would at the least not be praiseworthy.
For every praise must be based on some reason and here ex hypothesithere is none.
On the contrary, I hold that God does nothing for which He does not merit being
glorified.