DISCOURSE ONMETAPHYSICS 589
clarify and digest their thoughts in the manner of analytical geometry, he would find a
treasure store of very important truths which could be demonstrated completely.
- NOTIONSDEFINED BYEXTENSIONINVOLVESOMETHING
IMAGINARY ANDCANNOTCONSTITUTE THEESSENCE OFBODIES
But, to take up again the thread of our considerations, I believe that any one who medi-
tates on the nature of substance as I have explained it above will find that either bodies
are not substances in strict metaphysical rigour (the view indeed of the Platonists), or
that the whole nature of body does not consist solely in extension, i.e. in size, shape
and motion. On the contrary, something related to souls which is commonly called a
“substantial form” has necessarily to be recognised in them, though that makes no more
difference to the phenomena than the souls of animals, if they have any. It can even be
demonstrated that the notions of size, shape and motion are not so distinct as is imag-
ined and that they involve something imaginary and relative to our perceptions, just as
colour, heat and other similar qualities also do, (to an even greater extent)—we may
doubt that these are truly in the nature of external things. That is why qualities of these
kinds could not constitute any substance. And if there were no other principle of iden-
tity in body than the one just considered, no body would ever last more than a moment.
Nevertheless, souls and substantial forms of other bodies are very different from
intelligent souls, who alone know what they do, and which not only do not naturally
perish but even for ever retain the basis of the knowledge of what they are. This makes
them liable to punishment and reward, and makes them citizens of the republic of the
universe whose monarch is God. It also follows that all other creatures ought to serve
them, something we shall discuss more fully presently.
- SINCE THEINDIVIDUALNOTION OFEVERYPERSONINCLUDES
ONCE FORALLEVERYTHING THATWILLEVERHAPPEN TOHIM,
INITARE TOBESEEN THEA PRIORIPROOFS OFEAC HEVENT,
ORRATHERWHYONEHAPPENEDRATHER THAN THEOTHER.
BUTALTHOUGHTHESETRUTHSAREASSURED, THEYDONOT
CEASE TOBECONTINGENT, SINCETHEYAREBASED ON THEFREE
WILL OFGOD OR OFCREATURES. THEREAREALWAYSREASONS
FORTHEIRCHOICES BUTTHESEINCLINEWITHOUTNECESSITATING
But a great difficulty can arise from the foundations laid above, and before proceed-
ing further, we must try to deal with it. We said that the notion of an individual sub-
stance includes once for all everything that can ever happen to it, and that by
considering this notion, we can see in it everything that can truly be stated about it,
just as we can see in the nature of the circle all the properties that can be derived from
it. But from that it seems that all events will become fatally necessary that the differ-
ence between necessary and contingent truths will be destroyed, that all the fate of the
Stoics will take the place of liberty, there will no longer be any room for human
liberty, and absolute fate will reign over all our actions as well as over all other events
in the world. My reply is: we must distinguish between what is certain and what is
necessary. Everyone agrees that future contingents are assured since God foresees
them, but it is not for all that admitted that they are necessary. But (it will be said) if