590 GOTTFRIEDLEIBNIZ
some conclusion can be infallibly deduced from a definition or notion, it will be nec-
essary. Now in fact we do maintain that everything that is to happen to a person is
already included virtually in his nature or notion, just as the properties of a circle are
included in its definition. So the difficulty remains. In order to give a sound answer,
I claim that connection or derivation is of two kinds: one is absolutely necessary
(its contrary implies a contradiction) and occurs with eternal truths like those of
geometry; the other is necessary only ex hypothesi, by accident, so to speak, but in
itself it is contingent, since its contrary does not imply a contradiction. This connec-
tion is based, not on the absolutely pure ideas and God’s bare understanding alone,
but also on His free decrees and the connection of the universe.
Let us take an example. Since Peter will deny our Lord, that action is included in
his notion, for we are supposing it to be in the nature of such a perfect notion to include
everything, so that the predicate should be included in it,ut possit inesse subjecto. We
could say that it is not in virtue of this notion or idea or nature that he must sin, since
that only applies to him because God knows everything. But, it will be insisted, his
nature or form corresponds to his notion. I reply that it is indeed true and since God
imposed this personality on him he must henceforth conform to it. I could reply with the
objection of future contingents, for these have as yet no reality outside the understand-
ing and the will, and since God gave them this form in advance, they will have to con-
form to it all the same.
But I prefer to deal with difficulties than make excuses for them with examples of
some other similar difficulties, and what I am going to say will help clarify both. Thus
it is here that we must apply the distinction between the kinds of connection. I say that
what happens in accordance with these prior conditions is assured, but that it is not
necessary; and if he did the opposite, he would be doing nothing impossible in itself
though it would be ex hypothesiimpossible that this should happen. For if someone
were capable of completing the whole of the demonstration by virtue of which he
proved the connection between the subject Peter and the predicate (namely, his denial),
he would show that this fact had its basis in his notion or nature, and that it was reason-
able and consequently assured that it should come about; but he would not show that it
was necessary in itself, nor that its contrary implied a contradiction. In almost the same
way, it is reasonable and assured that God will always do the best, although what is less
perfect involves no contradiction in itself.
For it would be found that this demonstration of this predicate of Peter is not as
absolute as those of numbers and geometry, but that it supposes the sequence of things
freely chosen by God and founded on the first free decree of God, which always leads
him to do what is most perfect, as well as on the decree God made (in consequence of
the first) concerning human nature, which is that man will always (although freely) do
what seems best. Now every truth founded on decrees of this kind is contingent,
although certain, since those decrees make no difference to the possibility of things
and, as I have already said, although God assuredly always chooses the best, that does
not prevent what is less perfect remaining possible in itself, though it does not happen.
It is not its impossibility but its imperfection that causes it to be rejected. Nothing is
necessary if its contrary is possible.
Hence, we are in a position to meet such difficulties, great as they may appear to
be (and indeed they are no less pressing for all others who have ever dealt with this mat-
ter), provided it is fully realised that contingent propositions have reasons for being that
way rather than otherwise, or (what comes to the same thing) that there are a priori
proofs of their truth which make them certain and show that the subject-predicate