THREEDIALOGUES(2) 653
HYLAS: I do not pretend to have any notion of it.
PHILONOUS: And what reason have you to think this unknown, this inconceiv-
able somewhat does exist? Is it that you imagine God cannot act as well without it; or
that you find by experience the use of some such thing, when you form ideas in your
own mind?
HYLAS: You are always teasing me for reasons of my belief. Pray what reasons
have you not to believe it?
PHILONOUS: It is to me a sufficient reason not to believe the existence of anything,
if I see no reason for believing it. But, not to insist on reasons for believing, you will not
so much as let me know what it is you would have me believe; since you say you have
no manner of notion of it. After all, let me entreat you to consider whether it be like a
philosopher, or even like a man of common sense, to pretend to believe you know not
what, and you know not why.
HYLAS: Hold, Philonous. When I tell you matter is an instrument,I do not mean
altogether nothing. It is true I know not the particular kind of instrument; but, however,
I have some notion of instrument in general,which I apply to it.
PHILONOUS: But what if it should prove that there is something, even in the most
general notion of instrument,as taken in a distinct sense from cause,which makes the
use of it inconsistent with the divine attributes?
HYLAS: Make that appear and I shall give up the point.
PHILONOUS: What mean you by the general nature or notion of instrument?
HYLAS: That which is common to all particular instruments composes the general
notion.
PHILONOUS: Is it not common to all instruments, that they are applied to the doing
those things only which cannot be performed by the mere act of our wills? Thus, for
instance, I never use an instrument to move my finger, because it is done by a volition.
But I should use one if I were to remove part of a rock, or tear up a tree by the roots. Are
you of the same mind? Or, can you show any example where an instrument is made use
of in producing an effect immediately depending on the will of the agent?
HYLAS: I own I cannot.
PHILONOUS: How therefore can you suppose that an all-perfect spirit, on whose
will all things have an absolute and immediate dependence, should need an instru-
ment in his operations, or, not needing it, make use of it? Thus it seems to me that
you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless inactive instrument to be incompatible
with the infinite perfection of God; that is, by your own confession, to give up the
point.
HYLAS: It does not readily occur what I can answer you.
PHILONOUS: But, methinks you should be ready to own the truth, when it has
been fairly proved to you. We indeed, who are beings of finite powers, are forced to
make use of instruments. And the use of an instrument shows the agent to be limited
by rules of another’s prescription, and that he cannot obtain his end but in such a way,
and by such conditions. Whence it seems a clear consequence, that the supreme
unlimited agent uses no tool or instrument at all. The will of an omnipotent spirit is no
sooner exerted than executed, without the application of means; which, if they are
employed by inferior agents, it is not upon account of any real efficacy that is in them,
or necessary aptitude to produce any effect, but merely in compliance with the laws of
nature, or those conditions prescribed to them by the first cause, who is himself above
all limitation or prescription whatsoever.