THREEDIALOGUES(2) 655
PHILONOUS: Those things which you say are present to God, without doubt he
perceives.
HYLAS: Certainly; otherwise they could not be to him an occasion of acting.
PHILONOUS: Not to insist now on your making sense of this hypothesis, or
answering all the puzzling questions and difficulties it is liable to: I only ask whether
the order and regularity observable in the series of our ideas, or the course of nature, be
not sufficiently accounted for by the wisdom and power of God; and whether it does
not derogate from those attributes, to suppose he is influenced, directed, or put in
mind, when and what he is to act, by an unthinking substance? And, lastly, whether, in
case I granted all you contend for, it would make anything to your purpose; it not being
easy to conceive how the external or absolute existence of an unthinking substance,
distinct from its being perceived, can be inferred from my allowing that there are
certain things perceived by the mind of God, which are to him the occasion of produc-
ing ideas in us?
HYLAS: I am perfectly at a loss what to think, this notion of occasion seeming now
altogether as groundless as the rest.
PHILONOUS: Do you not at length perceive that in all these different acceptations of
matter,you have been only supposing you know not what, for no manner of reason, and
to no kind of use?
HYLAS: I freely own myself less fond of my notions since they have been so accu-
rately examined. But still, methinks, I have some confused perception that there is such
a thing as matter.
PHILONOUS: Either you perceive the being of matter immediately or mediately.
If immediately, pray inform me by which of the senses you perceive it. If mediately, let
me know by what reasoning it is inferred from those things which you perceive immedi-
ately. So much for the perception. Then for the matter itself, I ask whether it is object,
substratum,cause, instrument, or occasion? You have already pleaded for each of these,
shifting your notions, and making matter to appear sometimes in one shape, then in
another. And what you have offered hath been disapproved and rejected by yourself.
If you have anything new to advance I would gladly bear it.
HYLAS: I think I have already offered all I had to say on those heads. I am at a loss
what more to urge.
PHILONOUS: And yet you are loath to part with your old prejudice. But, to make you
quit it more easily, I desire that, beside what has been hitherto suggested, you will farther
consider whether, upon supposition that matter exists, you can possibly conceive how
you should be affected by it. Or, supposing it did not exist, whether it be not evident you
might for all that be affected with the same ideas you now are, and consequently have the
very same reasons to believe its existence that you now can have.
HYLAS: I acknowledge it is possible we might perceive all things just as we do
now, though there was no matter in the world; neither can I conceive, if there be matter,
how it should produce any idea in our minds. And, I do farther grant you have entirely
satisfied me that it is impossible there should be such a thing as matter in any of the
foregoing acceptations. But still I cannot help supposing that there is matterin some
sense or other. What that is I do not indeed pretend to determine.
PHILONOUS: I do not expect you should define exactly the nature of that unknown
being. Only be pleased to tell me whether it is a substance; and if so, whether you can
suppose a substance without accidents; or, in case you suppose it to have accidents or
qualities, I desire you will let me know what those qualities are, at least what is meant by
matter’s supporting them?