656 GEORGEBERKELEY
HYLAS: We have already argued on those points. I have no more to say to them.
But, to prevent any farther questions, let me tell you I at present understand by matter
neither substance nor accident, thinking nor extended being, neither cause, instrument,
nor occasion, but something entirely unknown, distinct from all these.
PHILONOUS: It seems then you include in your present notion of matter nothing but
the general abstract idea of entity.
HYLAS: Nothing else; save only that I superadd to this general idea the negation of
all those particular things, qualities, or ideas, that I perceive, imagine, or in anywise
apprehend.
PHILONOUS: Pray where do you suppose this unknown matter to exist?
HYLAS: Oh Philonous! Now you think you have entangled me, for, if I say it
exists in place, then you will infer that it exists in the mind, since it is agreed that place
or extension exists only in the mind. But I am not ashamed to own my ignorance.
I know not where it exists; only I am sure it exists not in place. There is a negative
answer for you. And you must expect no other to all the questions you put for the
future about matter.
PHILONOUS: Since you will not tell me where it exists, be pleased to inform me
after what manner you suppose it to exist, or what you mean by its existence?
HYLAS: It neither thinks nor acts, neither perceives nor is perceived.
PHILONOUS: But what is there positive in your abstracted notion of its existence?
HYLAS: Upon a nice observation, I do not find I have any positive notion or meaning
at all. I tell you again, I am not ashamed to own my ignorance. I know not what is meant
by its existence,or how it exists.
PHILONOUS: Continue, good Hylas, to act the same ingenuous part, and tell me
sincerely whether you can frame a distinct idea of Entity in general, prescinded from
and exclusive of all thinking and corporeal beings, all particular things whatsoever.
HYLAS: Hold, let me think a little—I profess, Philonous I do not find that I can. At
first glance, methought I had some dilute and airy notion of pure entity in abstract; but,
upon closer attention, it hath quite vanished out of sight. The more I think on it, the
more am I confirmed in my prudent resolution of giving none but negative answers, and
not pretending to the least degree of any positive knowledge or conception of matter, its
where,its how,its entity,or anything belonging to it.
PHILONOUS: When, therefore, you speak of the existence of matter, you have not
any notion in your mind?
HYLAS: None at all.
PHILONOUS: Pray tell me if the case stands not thus: At first, from a belief of mater-
ial substance, you would have it that the immediate objects existed without the mind; then
that they are archetypes; then causes; next instruments; then occasions: lastly something
in general,which being interpreted proves nothing.So matter comes to nothing. What
think you, Hylas, is not this a fair summary of your whole proceeding?
HYLAS: Be that as it will, yet I still insist upon it, that our not being able to conceive
a thing is no argument against its existence.
PHILONOUS: That from a cause, effect, operation, sign, or other circumstance,
there may reasonably be inferred the existence of a thing not immediately perceived;
and that it were absurd for any man to argue against the existence of that thing, from his
having no direct and positive notion of it, I freely own. But, where there is nothing of all
this; where neither reason nor revelation induces us to believe the existence of a thing;
where we have not even a relative notion of it; where an abstraction is made from per-
ceiving and being perceived, from spirit and idea: lastly, where there is not so much as