THREEDIALOGUES(2) 657
the most inadequate or faint idea pretended to—I will not indeed thence conclude
against the reality of any notion, or existence of anything; but my inference shall be,
that you mean nothing at all; that you employ words to no manner of purpose, without
any design or signification whatsoever. And I leave it to you to consider how mere jar-
gon should be treated.
HYLAS: To deal frankly with you, Philonous, your arguments seem in themselves
unanswerable; but they have not so great an effect on me as to produce that entire con-
viction, that hearty acquiescence, which attends demonstration. I find myself relapsing
into an obscure surmise of I know not what,matter.
PHILONOUS: But, are you not sensible, Hylas, that two things must concur to take
away all scruple, and work a plenary assent in the mind? Let a visible object be set in
never so clear a light, yet, if there is any imperfection in the sight, or if the eye is not
directed towards it, it will not be distinctly seen. And though a demonstration be never
so well grounded and fairly proposed, yet, if there is withal a stain of prejudice, or a
wrong bias on the understanding, can it be expected on a sudden to perceive clearly, and
adhere firmly to the truth? No; there is need of time and pains: the attention must be
awakened and detained by a frequent repetition of the same thing placed oft in the same,
oft in different lights. I have said it already, and find I must still repeat and inculcate,
that it is an unaccountable licence you take, in pretending to maintain you know not
what, for you know not what reason, to you know not what purpose. Can this be paral-
leled in any art or science, any sect or profession of men? Or is there anything so
barefacedly groundless and unreasonable to be met with even in the lowest of common
conversation? But, perhaps you will still say, matter may exist; though at the same time
you neither know what is meant by matter,or by its existence.This indeed is surprising,
and the more so because it is altogether voluntary, you not being led to it by any one rea-
son; for I challenge you to show me that thing in nature which needs matter to explain
or account for it.
HYLAS: The reality of things cannot be maintained without supposing the exis-
tence of matter. And is not this, think you, a good reason why I should be earnest in its
defence?
PHILONOUS: The reality of things! What things, sensible or intelligible?
HYLAS: Sensible things.
PHILONOUS: My glove for example?
HYLAS: That, or any other thing perceived by the senses.
PHILONOUS: But to fix on some particular thing. Is it not a sufficient evidence to
me of the existence of this glove,that I see it, and feel it, and wear it? Or, if this will not
do, how is it possible I should be assured of the reality of this thing, which I actually see
in this place, by supposing that some unknown thing, which I never did or can see,
exists after an unknown manner, in an unknown place, or in no place at all? How can the
supposed reality of that which is intangible be a proof that anything tangible really
exists? Or, of that which is invisible, that any visible thing, or, in general of anything
which is imperceptible, that a perceptible exists? Do but explain this and I shall think
nothing too hard for you.
HYLAS: Upon the whole, I am content to own the existence of matter is highly
improbable, but the direct and absolute impossibility of it does not appear to me.
PHILONOUS: But granting matter to be possible, yet, upon that account merely, it
can have no more claim to existence than a golden mountain, or a centaur.
HYLAS: I acknowledge it; but still you do not deny it is possible; and that which is
possible, for aught you know, may actually exist.