THREEDIALOGUES(3) 663
HYLAS: Notwithstanding all you have said, to me it seems that, according to your
own way of thinking, and in consequence of your own principles, it should follow that you
are only a system of floating ideas, without any substance to support them. Words are not
to be used without a meaning. And, as there is no more meaning in spiritual substance
than in material substance,the one is to be exploded as well as the other.
PHILONOUS: How often must I repeat, that I know or am conscious of my own
being; and that I myselfam not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle
that perceives, knows, wills, and operates about ideas I know that I, one and the same
self, perceive both colours and sounds: that a colour cannot perceive a sound, nor a
sound a colour: that I am therefore one individual principle, distinct from colour and
sound, and, for the same reason, from all other sensible things and inert ideas. But, I am
not in like manner conscious either of the existence or essence of matter. On the con-
trary, I know that nothing inconsistent can exist, and that the existence of matter implies
an inconsistency. Farther, I know what I mean when I affirm that there is a spiritual sub-
stance or support of ideas, that is, that a spirit knows and perceives ideas. But, I do not
know what is meant when it is said that an unperceiving substance hath inherent in it
and supports either ideas or the archetypes of ideas. There is therefore upon the whole
no parity of case between spirit and matter.
HYLAS: I own myself satisfied in this point. But, do you in earnest think the real
existence of sensible things consists in their being actually perceived? If so; how comes
it that all mankind distinguish between them? Ask the first man you meet, and he shall
tell you,to be perceivedis one thing, and to existis another.
PHILONOUS: I am content, Hylas, to appeal to the common sense of the world for the
truth of my notion. Ask the gardener why he thinks yonder cherry-tree exists in the garden,
and he shall tell you, because he sees and feels it; in a word, because he perceives it by his
senses. Ask him why he thinks an orange-tree not to be there, and he shall tell you, because
he does not perceive it. What he perceives by sense, that he terms a real being, and says it is
or exists;but, that which is not perceivable, the same, he says, has no being.
HYLAS: Yes, Philonous, I grant the existence of a sensible thing consists in being
perceivable, but not in being actually perceived.
PHILONOUS: And what is perceivable but an idea? And can an idea exist without
being actually perceived? These are points long since agreed between us.
HYLAS: But, be your opinion never so true, yet surely you will not deny it is shock-
ing, and contrary to the common sense of men. Ask the fellow whether yonder tree hath
an existence out of his mind: what answer think you he would make?
PHILONOUS: The same that I should myself, to wit, that it does exist out of his
mind. But then to a Christian it cannot surely be shocking to say, the real tree, existing
without his mind, is truly known and comprehended by (that is exists in) the infinite
mind of God. Probably he may not at first glance be aware of the direct and immediate
proof there is of this; inasmuch as the very being of a tree, or any other sensible thing,
implies a mind wherein it is. But the point itself he cannot deny. The question between
the materialists and me is not, whether things have a real existence out of the mind of
this or that person, but whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from being per-
ceived by God, and exterior to all minds. This indeed some heathens and philosophers
have affirmed, but whoever entertains notions of the Deity suitable to the Holy
Scriptures will be of another opinion.
HYLAS: But, according to your notions, what difference is there between real things,
and chimeras formed by the imagination, or the visions of a dream—since they are all
equally in the mind?