664 GEORGEBERKELEY
PHILONOUS: The ideas formed by the imagination are faint and indistinct; they
have, besides, an entire dependence on the will. But the ideas perceived by sense, that
is, real things, are more vivid and clear; and, being imprinted on the mind by a spirit dis-
tinct from us, have not the like dependence on our will. There is therefore no danger of
confounding these with the foregoing; and there is as little of confounding them with
the visions of a dream, which are dim, irregular, and confused. And, though they should
happen to be never so lively and natural, yet, by their not being connected, and of a
piece with the preceding and subsequent transactions of our lives, they might easily be
distinguished from realities. In short, by whatever method you distinguish thingsfrom
chimerason your scheme, the same, it is evident, will hold also upon mine. For, it must
be, I presume, by some perceived difference; and I am not for depriving you of any one
thing that you perceive.
HYLAS: But still, Philonous, you hold, there is nothing in the world but spirits and
ideas. And this, you must needs acknowledge, sounds very oddly.
PHILONOUS: I own the word idea,not being commonly used for thing,sounds
something out of the way. My reason for using it was, because a necessary relation to
the mind is understood to be implied by that term; and it is now commonly used by
philosophers to denote the immediate objects of the understanding. But, however oddly
the proposition may sound in words, yet it includes nothing so very strange or shocking
in its sense, which in effect amounts to no more than this, to wit, that there are only
things perceiving, and things perceived; or that every unthinking being is necessarily,
and from the very nature of its existence, perceived by some mind; if not by a finite cre-
ated mind, yet certainly by the infinite mind of God, in whom “we live, and move, and
have our being.” Is this as strange as to say, the sensible qualities are not on the objects:
or that we cannot be sure of the existence of things, or know any thing of their real
natures—though we both see and feel them, and perceive them by all our senses?
HYLAS: And, in consequence of this, must we not think there are no such things as
physical or corporeal causes; but that a spirit is the immediate cause of all the phenomena
in nature? Can there be anything more extravagant than this?
PHILONOUS: Yes, it is infinitely more extravagant to say—a thing which is inert
operates on the mind, and which is unperceiving is the cause of our perceptions, without
any regard either to consistency, or the old known axiom:Nothing can give to another
that which it hath not itself.Besides, that which to you, I know not for what reason,
seems so extravagant is no more than the Holy Scriptures assert in a hundred places. In
them God is represented as the sole and immediate author of all those effects which some
heathens and philosophers are wont to ascribe to nature, matter, fate, or the like unthink-
ing principle. This is so much the constant language of Scripture that it were needless to
confirm it by citations.
HYLAS: You are not aware Philonous, that in making God the immediate author of
all the motions in nature, you make him the author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and
the like heinous sins.
PHILONOUS: In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt is the
same, whether a person commits an action with or without an instrument. In case there-
fore you suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument or occasion, called matter,
you as truly make him the author of sin as I, who think him the immediate agent in all
those operations vulgarly ascribed to nature. I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude
does not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of
the will from the laws of reason and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in
a battle, or putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the outward