666 GEORGEBERKELEY
to be connected with those immediately perceived: or, concerning the ideas that, from
what he perceives at present, he imagines would be perceived in other circumstances.
The case is the same with regard to the Copernican system. We do not here perceive any
motion of the earth: but it were erroneous thence to conclude, that, in case we were
placed at as great a distance from that as we are now from the other planets, we should
not then perceive its motion.
HYLAS: I understand you; and must needs own you say things plausible enough. But,
give me leave to put you in mind of one thing. Pray, Philonous, were you not formerly as
positive that matter existed, as you are now that it does not?
PHILONOUS: I was. But here lies the difference. Before, my positiveness was
founded, without examination, upon prejudice; but now, after inquiry, upon evidence.
HYLAS: After all, it seems our dispute is rather about words than things. We agree
in the thing, but differ in the name. That we are affected with ideas from without is evi-
dent, and it is no less evident that there must be (I will not say archetypes, but) Powers
without the mind, corresponding to those ideas. And, as these Powers cannot subsist by
themselves, there is some subject of them necessarily to be admitted; which I call
matter,and you call spirit.This is all the difference.
PHILONOUS: Pray, Hylas, is that powerful being, or subject of powers, extended?
HYLAS: It hath not extension; but it hath the power to raise in you the idea of
extension.
PHILONOUS: It is therefore itself unextended?
HYLAS: I grant it.
PHILONOUS: Is it not also active?
HYLAS: Without doubt. Otherwise, how could we attribute powers to it?
PHILONOUS: Now let me ask you two questions:First,whether it be agreeable to
the usage either of philosophers or others to give the name matterto an unextended
active being? And,secondly,whether it be not ridiculously absurd to misapply names
contrary to the common use of language?
HYLAS: Well then, let it not be called matter, since you will have it so, but some
third naturedistinct from matter and spirit. For what reason is there why you should call
it spirit? Does not the notion of spirit imply that it is thinking, as well as active and
unextended?
PHILONOUS: My reason is this: because I have a mind to have some notion of
meaning in what I say: but I have no notion of any action distinct from volition, nei-
ther can I conceive volition to be anywhere but in a spirit: therefore, when I speak of
an active being, I am obliged to mean a spirit. Beside, what can be plainer than that a
thing which hath no ideas in itself cannot impart them to me, and, if it hath ideas,
surely it must be a spirit. To make you comprehend the point still more clearly if it be
possible, I assert as well as you that, since we are affected from without, we must
allow powers to be without, in a being distinct from ourselves. So far we are agreed.
But then we differ as to the kind of this powerful being. I will have it to be spirit, you
matter, or I know not what (I may add too, you know not what) third nature. Thus,
I prove it to be spirit. From the effects I see produced, I conclude there are actions;
and, because actions, volitions; and, because there are volitions, there must be a will.
Again, the things I perceive must have an existence, they or their archetypes, out of
my mind: but, being ideas, neither they nor their archetypes can exist otherwise than
in an understanding, there is therefore an understanding. But will and understanding
constitute in the strictest sense a mind or spirit. The powerful cause, therefore, of my
ideas is in strict propriety of speech a spirit.